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LIES BETWEEN MOMMY AND DADDY:
THE CASE FOR RECOGNIZING
SPOUSAL EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS
BASED ON DOMESTIC DECEIT
THAT INTERFERES WITH
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIPS
Linda L. Berger*
Steve and Wendy married in 1990 and a daughter, Stephanie,
was born eleven months later.' Even though Wendy knew that
Stephanie was not Steve's daughter, she did not tell him until she
challenged his paternity in divorce proceedings nearly three years
later, after Steve sought sole custody of Stephanie. Wendy lied
about the father, telling Steve that she had conceived Stephanie dur-
ing a rape. She persuaded Steve to have a blood test to establish pa-
ternity, knowing that the test would prove Steve was not the biologi-
cal father. Wendy finally admitted the truth during a deposition,
telling Steve that Stephanie was the product of a love affair that had
started before and continued throughout their marriage. After the
family court ruled that Steve was still Stephanie's legal father, Steve
* Linda L. Berger is an assistant professor at Thomas Jefferson School of
Law. The author gratefully acknowledges the support provided by the School
of Law, Dean Kenneth Vandevelde, and her colleagues.
1. These facts are based on Steve H. v. Wendy S., 57 Cal. App. 4th 379,
380, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90, 91 (Ct. App. 1997), cert. granted, 946 P.2d 817, 68
Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (1997), cert. dismissed, 960 P.2d 510, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 706
(1998). About a year after the California Supreme Court granted review of the
appellate court decision, the parties agreed to dismiss the petition for review,
apparently as part of a settlement. Under the California Rules of Court, once
review is granted the appellate opinion becomes "unpublished" and it has no
precedential value in the California courts. See CAL. R. CT. 976 ("no opinion
superseded by a grant of review... shall be published"); CAL. R. CT. 977 (an
unpublished opinion "shall not be cited or relied on by a court or a party in any
other action or proceeding").
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sued Wendy for the emotional distress she caused in her effort to de-
stroy his parental relationship with Stephanie.'
Steve filed his lawsuit in California, a state that allows spouses
to sue one another and recognizes intentional infliction of emotional
distress (flED).3 The parties agreed that this story, if proved, showed
that Wendy intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon Steve.4
Even though Steve stated a cause of action, both the trial and appel-
late courts found that public policy exempted such spousal emotional
distress claims from the general rules.5 Steve could not sue for
Wendy's adultery nor for her effort to destroy his parental relation-
ship with Stephanie because of the statutory abolition of "heart
balm" claims such as criminal conversation and alienation of affec-
tions. 6 Steve could not sue for Wendy's lie after his custody request,
nor could he sue after Wendy admitted the truth in the deposition be-
cause "[t]he law should not allow an emotional distress claim every
time one party to a dissolution proceeding offers evidence or makes
an assertion that upsets the other party.",7 In addition, Steve could
not sue for Wendy's fraud in creating a parent-child relationship be-
cause courts are reluctant to recognize that having a child can cause
legally compensable damages. 8 Finally, Steve could not sue for
Wendy's fraud in attempting to destroy his parent-child relationship
because it is considered to be in the "best interest" of the child to
protect her from being caught in the middle of such litigation. 9
2. In particular, Steve based his claim on Wendy's lying about being
raped, inducing him to take a blood test, and concealing from him that he was
not Stephanie's father. See Steve H., 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91-92.
3. See id. at 92.
4. See id. at 92, 98 n.1 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
5. See id. at 93-94.
6. Steve did not sue for Wendy's adultery, but the court used the policies
underlying California's abolition of "heart balm" actions such as adultery as
one of its reasons for rejecting Steve's claim. See id. at 95-96 (analogizing
Steve's claim to an action for alienation of a child's affection).
7. Id. at 94-95. The court did not address the statutory privilege protecting
communications made in the course of litigation, apparently because it was not
raised. Had Steve chosen to claim that the statements Wendy made during the
dissolution proceedings caused his emotional distress, the privilege would have
barred his action. See infra Part ILI.B.
8. See id. at 92-93.
9. See id. at 93-94.
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This Article discusses whether courts should recognize spousal
IED causes of action based on intentional lies that interfere with the
establishment or the continuation of parent-child relationships. The
Article begins with an overview of the currents in family law and tort
law that converge in domestic tort actions. Next, it reviews the cur-
rent status of a particular domestic tort: spousal emotional distress.
It then examines the evolution of emotional distress claims based on
interference with parent-child relationships, moving from Califor-
nia's early and continuing rejection of these claims to the very recent
recognition of these claims by other states. Finally, it evaluates the
arguments for and against allowing claims such as Steve's and con-
cludes that one spouse's intentional and unjustified interference with
a parent-child relationship should lead to the other spouse's liability
for any resulting emotional distress.
I. CROSS-CURRENTS OF FAMILY LAW AND TORT LAW
Domestic torts lie at the intersection of family law and tort law,
where the 1900s image of the family as an intensely private world
still collides with the 1960s vision of marriage as the voluntary join-
der of independent and equal personalities.10 At the turn of the cen-
tury, the legal system's perceived role was to protect the family unit
from intrusion, particularly from external threats of destruction
caused by immorality. In the mid-century vision, the legal system's
role was to protect the rights of each spouse to personal expression,
sexual freedom, fault-free dissolution, and an equal share in property.
Change came first in the laws regulating external disruption of fam-
ily relationships. Subsequent changes occurred in the laws regulat-
ing tort liability and internal disruption of family relationships. The
resulting convergence of cultural and legal changes made domestic
torts possible while simultaneously making them suspect.
10. Viewing the family as a collective entity is consistent with a high de-
gree of power in the parents, historically the father, as well as "a high degree of
family privacy and autonomy and a minimum of state intervention in the allo-
cation and exercise of power by family members." DAVID WESTFALL, FAMILY
LAW 93 (1994). Viewing the family as a group of individuals accords greater
recognition to the rights of the family members as individuals and results in
"more frequent intervention by the state to protect those interests." Id.
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At the turn of the century, the laws governing family relation-
ships resembled modem tort law because they were based on fault."
Although interspousal immunity barred tort claims between spouses,
the innocent partner could be compensated for a spouse's wrongdo-
ing through a higher financial award upon divorce.' 2 The wronged
spouse could recover damages from third parties through common
law causes of action (adultery and alienation of affections), and a
wronged would-be spouse could also recover through a claim for
breach of promise.' 3 These traditional causes of action, collectively
known as "heart balm" claims, were based on a legal fiction that
family members had protectable interests in one another's services.14
11. At the beginning of this century, "[t]he divorce decree... came to re-
semble a tort judgment; both being granted for the fault of the defendant caus-
ing harm to the plaintiff, and both being denied where the plaintiff either con-
sented or was himself at fault" 1 HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF
DOMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 698 (2d ed. 1987).
12. See id.
13. The fourth "heart balm" action was seduction, a common law tort ac-
tionable by a parent against an individual for having sexual intercourse with a
minor female. A loss of services or ability to render them was required to re-
cover damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 701 & cmt. c
(1977). Adultery, once a crime whose tort version was known as criminal
conversation, sought to recover damages from a third party who had sexual
intercourse with a spouse. See id. § 685. Alienation of affections was a
broader claim than adultery, seeking damages for the loss of marital affections,
society and companionship of the other spouse, assistance, and services as well
as the loss of a sexual relationship; an actual loss of affections was necessary
to maintain the claim. See id. § 683 & cmts. c, f. These three actions could be
brought only against a third party and so were not barred by interspousal im-munity. Breach of promise was brought against the person who failed to be-
come the spouse in breach of his or her promise and so this action could not be
barred by interspousal immunity. See id. § 698 (stating no right of action
against third person who interferes in betrothal).
There was no common law right of action by a parent for alienation of a
child's affections. See id. § 699 & cmt. a (stating no action for mere alienation
of affections of child). Only a few cases recognized such an action based on
the emotional loss, but the common law did recognize a cause of action for in-
terference with the parents' right to the services and earnings of a minor child.
See Jeffery F. Ghent, Annotation, Right of Child or Parent to Recover for Al-
ienation of Other's Affections, 60 A.L.R. 3d 931, 935 & § 5b (1999).
14. The laws protecting interests in family relationships grew out of early
cases in which a master's economic interest in the status of his servants led to a
right to recover damages for the loss of their services; this loss of service was
the "gist of the legal wrong" in the common law family torts. FOWLER V.
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The torts sought "heart balm," compensation for the damage done by
lies and betrayals that destroyed family relationships, especially mar-
riages. Beginning in the 1930s, critics claimed that these torts led to
blackmail and extortion. Influenced by such criticism and by cul-
tural changes that included more divorces, more obvious infidelity,
and more recognition of personal autonomy, many states decided that
family members should no longer get damages for these kinds of de-
struction of marital relationships. 15 More than half the states now
have statutes abolishing the heart balm claims. In other states, courts
have abolished them by court decision.
16
Related criticisms and the same cultural trends led to the most
fundamental change in the laws governing family relationships: "no-
fault" divorce. 17 According to the critics, fault-based grounds for di-
vorce led to fraud and collusion by agreeing spouses but did not pre-
serve marriages or improve marital behavior1 s Instead of a long,
bitter, and expensive process, no-fault divorce promised an easy
factual finding-is the marriage broken?-followed by a seamless
and equitable distribution of property. 19 The adoption of no-fault
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 8.1, at 499-501 (2d ed. 1986).
15. The abolition of the "heart balrr' claims was supported by increasing
societal emphasis on personal choice, decriminalization of sexual activities,
and skepticism about whether the law can remedy hurt feelings and enforce
morality. See id.
16. See Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional
Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1296 (1996).
17. In 1969, California adopted the first state divorce code to eliminate
fault-based grounds for divorce; by 1985, when South Dakota added no-fault
to its list of fault-based grounds for divorce, every state had accepted "the con-
cept that marriage failure is itself an adequate reason for marital dissolution."
Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in
DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 6 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma H.
Kay eds., 1990).
18. Fault-based divorce "bore no relation to the causes, consequences and
purposes of divorce. It resulted in widespread hypocrisy, perjury or near per-
jury, and public contempt for the courts." CLARK, supra note 11, at 698; see
also IRAMARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW 165-68 (2d ed. 1991).
19. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) was approved by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 and
amended in 1971 and 1973. See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT 9A U.L.A.
104 (West 1998). The sole ground for divorce in UMDA is "that the marriage
is irretrievably broken." Id. The Conference decided that "[t]his standard will
redirect the law's attention from an unproductive assignment of blame to a
search for the realities of the marital situation." Id. The elimination of fault
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divorce laws in the 1970s and 1980s did not abolish all consideration
of marital fault. Rather, in many states, no-fault grounds for mar-
riage dissolution were simply added to an existing list of fault
grounds, and no-fault dissolution did not necessarily mean no-fault
financial or child custody decisions. Today, most spouses can obtain
a decree dissolving a marriage without first proving that their spouse
was guilty of marital misconduct.20 In states with laws similar to the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, property distribution and
spousal support amounts also are determined "without regard to
marital misconduct., 21 Still, a number of states allow their divorce
courts to consider fault when resolving financial issues.22 Moreover,
marital misconduct can affect financial decisions in even pure
no-fault jurisdictions because all states allow divorce courts to con-
sider misconduct that has directly affected how much property is
extended to spousal support, property division, and child support. See id.
Twenty-five years after adoption of UMDA, the American Law Institute
reconsidered whether divorce law should consider marital misconduct in set-
ting the financial remedies at divorce. The Chief Reporter to the American
Law Institute concluded "the difficulties with interspousal claims for emotional
losses may caution against their recognition in any forum. Certainly, there is
no reason for the dissolution law to invite the kind of claims with which the
tort law has had such difficulty." Ira Mark Ellman, The Place of Fault in a
Modem Divorce Law, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 773, 802 (1996).
In 1983, the National Conference adopted the Uniform Marital Property
Act According to the authors, property distribution upon dissolution of a mar-
riage would be "the handmaiden of no-fault divorce" if it were similar to prop-
erty distribution upon dissolution of a partnership. See UNIF. MARITAL
PROPERTY ACT 9A U.L.A. at 105 (West 1998). The act was designed to "rec-
ognize the respective contributions made by men and women during a mar-
riage ... by raising those contributions to the level of defined, shared and en-
forceable property rights at the time the contributions are made." Id. at 104.
20. All states allow a no-fault divorce to agreeing couples, and only a hand-
ful preclude a unilateral no-fault divorce. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note
16, at 1276-77.
21. UNIF. MARRiAGE & DIVORCE ACT §§ 307, 308(b) (amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. (West 1998).
22. According to the categories established in a 1996 article, 20 states ex-
clude fault entirely; 15 states are full-fault; five states are pure no-fault for
property, almost pure no-fault for alimony; three states are almost pure no-
fault; and seven are no-fault for property, full-fault for alimony. See Ellman,'
supra note 19, at 778-80. "Fault" also may be considered in child custody pro-
ceedings; bad conduct during the marriage may affect the custody decision,
which will affect the relative child support amounts. See, e.g., Ellman & Sug-
arman, supra note 16, at 1279 n.38.
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available and misconduct that has increased one spouse's need for
support.23
As the laws governing marriage pulled away from compensating
injuries caused by interference with the marital relationship, other ar-
eas of tort law moved towards recognizing more intangible injuries
and more tenuous relationships. 24  Domestic torts were able to
emerge only because the states began to reject the common law doc-
trine of interspousal immunity.25 Until the early part of this century,
interspousal immunity barred personal tort suits between spouses.26
Immunity was first justified by the English common law fiction that
the two persons in the marriage are one; therefore, you could not sue
23. See EUman, supra note 19, at 776-77.
24. "Marriage has become the only contract out of which a breaching party
may walk with impunity ... at the very time when so many other areas of law
moved from caveat emptor to an extraordinary, unprecedented concern for the
economic underdog." Harry D. Krause, On the Danger of Allowing Marital
Fault to Re-Emerge in the Guise of Torts, 73 No=E DAME L. REv. 1355, 1360
(1998); see also Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136,
146 (1992) (noting that tort law increasingly has recognized harms to relation-
ship interests "in a variety of contexts, including ftmilial, business, trust, and
employment associations"); Paula C. Murray & Brenda J. Winslett, The Con-
stitutional Right to Privacy and Emerging Tort Liability for Deceit in Interper-
sonal Relationships, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 779 (1986) (examining the growing
number of lawsuits based on deceit between sexual partners).
25. An early law review article recommended that all personal injury ac-
tions between spouses should be subject only to substantive limits resulting
from the relationship between the parties. See William E. McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HAR v. L. REv. 1030, 1055 (1930).
The next major article addressing domestic torts was Victor E. Schwartz, The
Serious Marital Offender: Tort Law as a Solution, 6 FAM. L.Q. 219 (1972).
As part of a no-fault divorce package, Professor Schwartz proposed that legis-
latures adopt a tort cause of action for "abuse of the marital relationship" by a
"serious marital offender." Id. at 222. Professor Schwartz proposed the tort to
encourage states to adopt no-fault divorce laws, believing that the main obsta-
cle to enactment was no-fault's inability to deal with such offenders. See id. at
222, 232. The proposed cause of action would have encompassed battery and
lIED.
26. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L.
REV. 359 (1989) for a history and analysis of interspousal tort immunity. See
also Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Modern Status of Interspousal Tort Immu-
nity in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions, 92 A.L.R. 3d 901 (1979)
(examining whether the common law rule of interspousal tort immunity is still
in effect in particular jurisdictions).
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the other half of yourself 2 7 Beginning in 1844, the states enacted the
Married Women's Acts, which gave a married woman a separate le-
gal identity and separate ownership of her own property.25 Under
these acts, a wife could sue her husband for any tort against her
property interests and for torts involving only pecuniary loss. 29 Be-
cause the statutes appeared to be intended to give spouses equal
standing, courts held that a husband could also sue his wife. 30 De-
spite these statutes, most American courts continued to uphold inter-
spousal immunity for torts based on personal injury on the grounds
that their legislatures had not intended the Married Women's Acts to
affect personal torts not involving property.3' Thus, neither spouse
could recover from the other for torts such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment, defamation, malicious prosecution, or negli-
gence causing only personal injury.32 In addition to legislative in-
tent, courts found new arguments to support interspousal immunity:
the preservation of marital harmony against the threat posed by per-
sonal tort actions between husband and wife, the possibility of trivial
actions for petty annoyances, the danger of fictitious or fraudulent
claims, and the availability of other remedies through divorce and
27. Under the common law doctrine of the legal identity of husband and
wife, "[tjhe legal existence of the wife was regarded as suspended for the du-
ration of the marriage and merged into that of the husband, so that she lost the
capacity to contract for herself or to sue or be sued without joinder of the hus-
band as plaintiff or defendant" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F
cmt. b (1979). Because the husband was entitled to all of the wife's choses in
action and became liable for the torts of his wife, committed either before or
during the marriage, it was impossible to maintain a tort action between hus-
band and wife:
If the man committed the tort; the woman's right would be a chose in
action that the husband could reduce to possession, and he must be
joined as plaintiff against himself and the proceeds recovered must be
paid to him. If the wife committed the tort, the husband would be li-
able to himself for it, and must be joined as a defendant in his own ac-
tion and pay his own judgment As a result it was held that neither
spouse could maintain an action against the other for any tort, whether
it was committed before or during the marriage.
Id.
28. See id. cmt. c.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
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criminal proceedings.3 3  In adopting a sweeping abolition of inter-
spousal immunity, the authors of the Restatement said these policy
reasons were "poor justifications for denying all remedy for a serious
and genuine wrong., 34 Beginning in 1914, the states began to abol-
ish interspousal immunity by statute or by court action.35 By 1997,
forty-five states and the District of Columbia had completely aban-
doned interspousal immunity, and five states had abrogated the im-
munity in limited circumstances.36
The states first to abolish interspousal immunity did so at a time
when tort law did not compensate intentional emotional injury. The
1934 Restatement of the Law of Torts did not allow recovery
for such injury.37 By 1948, the Restatement authors had reversed
their position and included the independent tort of TIED.38 Shortly
33. See id. cmt. d.
34. Id. The Restatement reflects the status of interspousal immunity in
most states today:
(1) A husband or wife is not immune from tort liability to the other
solely by reason of that relationship.
(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability
for an act or omission that, because of the marital relationship, is oth-
erwise privileged or is not tortious.
Id. The Restatement authors believed that marriage should broaden "[t]he
concept of consent to an intentional physical contact" and that "[t]he intimacy
of the family relationship may also involve some relaxation in the application
of the concept of reasonable care." Id. cmt. h; see also id. § 895G cmt. k (dis-
cussing how family life may relax some standards applicable to third parties).
35. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 359 (noting that seven jurisdictions abol-
ished interspousal immunity between 1914 and 1920, there was a gradual ero-
sion from 1920 to 1950, and immunity was transformed from a majority to a
minority rule between 1970 and 1989).
36. See Stacey A. Kawasaki, Interspousal Torts: A Procedural Framework
for Hawai'i, 19 U. HAw. L. REv. 377, 381-82 (1997); see also LEONARD KARP
& CHERYL L. KARP, DoMESTIc TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT AND
SEXUAL ABUSE app. B, at 691-94 (Supp. 1999).
37. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (1934) (stating that with exceptions
for assault and insult by common carriers, "conduct which is intended or which
though not so intended is likely to cause only a mental or emotional distur-
bance to another does not subject the actor to liability (a) for emotional distress
resulting therefrom, or (b) for bodily harm unexpectably resulting from such
disturbance").
38. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, SUPPLEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1948)
("One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional
distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily
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thereafter, state courts began recognizing the tort despite "the fear of
fictitious or trivial claims, distrust of the proof offered, and the diffi-
culty of setting up any satisfactory boundaries to liability. '39 The
1948 version, which based liability on intentionally causing severe
emotional distress without a privilege to do so, was revised in the
1965 version of the Restatement to base liability on extreme and out-
rageous conduct. 40 Through this change, the purposes of the tort be-
came protecting the interest in freedom from emotional distress and
condemning and punishing bad behavior.41  By 1993, forty-seven
states had adopted the tort.42
The abolition of interspousal immunity and the recognition of
RIED made the emergence of domestic torts possible. Combined
with the recognition of domestic violence as a crime,43 these family
and tort law movements allowed courts to imagine that a spouse
could recover for injury inflicted by a marital partner. Yet, despite
the nearly unanimous abolition of interspousal immunity and adop-
tion of HED, many courts have severely limited the circumstances in
which spouses may sue spouses.44 This hesitancy is linked to the
historical "view that such incidents are family affairs and not the true
business of the legal system!'45 and to the more modem view that
hann resulting from it").
39. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OFTORTS § 46 cmt. b (1965).
40. See id. § 46 (1965). The current Restatement formula is discussed in
more detail in section II.C.1.
41. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Out-
rageous Conduct, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 42, 54 (1982) (commenting that the em-
phasis on the outrageousness element means that the tort's focus is on punish-
ment rather than on compensation).
42. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993).
43. Violent acts committed between spouses have only been considered
crimes during the last twenty years, while the same violent acts committed
against strangers have long been criminal. See Leonore M.J. Simon, A Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Approach to the Legal Processing of Domestic Violence
Cases, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 43, 44 (1995).
44. Some commentators have suggested what amounts to a return to inter-
spousal tort immunity for all claims except those resulting from criminal con-
duct. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1335. These authors con-
clude that actionable spousal torts should include only those where the tortious
behavior is also a criminal act such as battery, certain assaults, and false im-
prisonment. See id. at 1343.
45. Simon, supra note 43, at 46. The traditional public/private distinction
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spouses are free actors whose sexual and moral conduct should not
be regulated by the state.46
II. CURRENT STATUS OF SPOUSAL IED CLAIMS BASED ON CONDUCT
THAT HARMS THE MARITAL RELATIONSHIP 47
Outside marriage, an RlED claim can arise without physical
manifestations and without physical contact. In other words, a cause
of action can be based on severe emotional distress and extreme and
outrageous words or nontouching conduct.41 Once interspousal im-
munity was abolished, it seemed logical to assume that spouses could
sue each other for any tort that would be actionable between strang-
ers.49 Once a state had recognized the independent tort of HED, it
has assumed a separation between the family and the state, marking a zone in
which "customary regulations governing contract torts, and criminal behavior
have not applied" and shielding private relations from public oversight See
Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning
the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT
THE CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at 192. Recent reforms that have minimized
state interference in the termination of marriage grow out of the same tradition.
See id. at 191, 192.
46. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Introduction, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS, supra note 17, at 1, 2.
47. Although in most cases involving emotional distress the spouse brings
the claim in connection with a dissolution proceeding, either in the same pro-
ceeding or in a separate tort action, no legal barrier appears to prevent a
spousal emotional distress claim by a still-married spouse; of course, few hap-
pily married spouses would bring such an action or could establish severe
emotional distress. Usually, a spouse will not contemplate a tort action until
filing for divorce. See Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and
Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 321, 363 (1997).
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. k (1965). Even out-
side the spousal context, compensable injuries for intentional or negligent in-
fliction of emotional distress historically were tied to physical impact, physical
manifestations of injury, or other proxies for emotional distress. See Levit, su-
pra note 24, at 170-72.
49. As a result articles about domestic torts began to appear in publications
reaching family lawyers, and in 1989, a lawyer and a psychologist published a
practitioners' guide to domestic torts. See KARP & KARP, supra note 36.
These authors described "an explosion of new domestic tort actions" as a result
of "[t]he weakening of family immunities . . .accompanied by increasing
numbers of marital dissolutions and a realization that existing legal remedies
for certain types of marital misconduct are inadequate." Id. at ix.
The articles included Doris J. Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law
in the Fifty States: An Overview, 20 FAM. L.Q. 439, 586 (1987) (identifying
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seemed logical to assume that spouses could sue each other for such
distress.50 This logic came easily to state courts in only two catego-
ries of cases: (1) where the spousal victim suffered physical injury
or the spousal tortfeasor committed physical violence, 5' and (2)
where state statutes provided explicit civil remedies for violations
such as eavesdropping and false allegations of child abuse.52 The
courts less easily reached the seemingly logical conclusion that
spouses could now sue each other for RED absent physical harm,
physical violence, or a statutory remedy. 3
domestic torts as an emerging trend in family law); Robert G. Spector, Marital
Torts, 15 FAM. L. REP. 3023 (1989) (describing various recent cases dealing
with marital torts); Robert G. Spector, Marital Torts: Actions for Tortious
Conduct Occurring During the Marriage, 5 AM. J. FAM. L. 71 (1991) (de-
scribing an "explosion of cases involving torts and the marital relationship").
50. Articles focusing specifically on spousal IED causes of action include:
Constance W. Cole, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Among Family
Members, 61 DENY. L.J. 553 (1984) (favoring the recognition of tort claims for
outrageous marital conduct that leads to serious emotional injury); Leonard
Karp, Spousal Infliction ofEmotional Distress... Beyond the Normal Ebb and
Flow of Married Life, 12 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM. L. 309 (1994) (describing a
growing national trend of tort claims for emotional distress arising as part of
divorce actions); Bradley A. Case, Note, Turning Marital Misery into Finan-
cial Fortune: Assertion of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
by Divorcing Spouses, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 101 (1995) (advocating
recognition of spousal IED claims and hearing them in divorce proceedings);
Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16.
51. As domestic violence was recognized as grounds for criminal sanctions,
it naturally became the basis for civil actions not only for assault and battery
but also for emotional distress. See, e.g., Dalton, supra note 47; Leonard Karp
& Cheryl L. Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow ... Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389 (1994); Merle
H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the Per Se Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L.
REv. 183 (1995).
52. See, e.g., M.G. v. J.C., 603 A.2d 990, 995 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1991) (eavesdropping), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Whitaker, 713
A.2d 20, 34 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) (wrongful death); Begier v. Strom,
46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Ct. App. 1996) (child abuse). Al-
though few flED cases have been based on civil remedies explicitly provided
by statute, it seems impossible to reject a cause of action on public policy
grounds when the state legislature has decided to allow the cause of action.
53. The authors of a practitioners' guide agree that most successful spousal
emotional distress claims involve actual or threatened physical abuse but note
that some courts have allowed claims absent severe physical maltreatment in
three general categories: transmission of sexual diseases, interference with
custodial rights, and conduct intended to cause severe psychological harm. See
460
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Because of the abolition of interspousal immunity and the adop-
tion of RED, courts could bar spousal HED claims outright only
upon finding compelling public policy reasons for doing so. Some
courts claimed to have found them, refusing to recognize spousal
RED claims at all. Other courts found that public policy raised the
standard for outrageous conduct in marriage: conduct that would be
outrageous between strangers might not be outrageous between
spouses.54 Courts that recognized the possibility that a spouse could
state an HED cause of action refused to allow HED claims based on
what judges believed was all too common in marriage: lies and be-
trayals, such as adultery, and harsh words and actions, such as insults
and outbursts.5
Rejecting arguments that marriage implies consent to physical
contact or privilege to abuse, most states now agree that a physically
KAM & KmRp, supra note 36, § 1.24, at 53-55 (Supp. 1999).
54. Compare Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1326 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991) (setting threshold of outrage in marriage high enough to prevent invasive
litigation of meritless claims; insults and outbursts fail to cross the threshold),
with Weiner, supra note 51, at 183-85 (discussing a successful civil suit for
IED based on two obscene phone calls made to a woman by the husband of a
co-worker).
55. If a finding of outrage must involve conduct "that goes well beyond the
common complaints divorcing spouses have about one another, then neither
adultery alone nor deceitful adultery can qualify." Ellman & Sugarman, supra
note 16, at 1317. Secret affairs and bullying behavior "may be wrongful, un-
seemly, and nasty--they certainly explain why the complainant would want a
divorce. But in the end, they amount to sufficiently customary marital mis-
conduct that, even if deplorable, simply does not rise to the level of 'outra-
geousness'-whatever that might be." Id. (referring to Ruprecht v. Ruprecht,
599 A.2d 604 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991), and Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812
P.2d 1320, 1325 (N.M. Ct App. 1991)); see also Strauss v. Cilek, 418 N.W. 2d
378 (Iowa Ct App. 1987) (holding wife's affair with husband's friend not out-
rageous enough in action filed by husband against friend); Whittington v.
Whittington, 766 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Ky. Ct App. 1989) (finding "ordinary fraud
and adultery can never reach the status of outrageous conduct" because they
are routine causes of divorce litigation and relief is available under Kentucky's
domestic relations laws); Poston v. Poston, 436 S.E.2d 854, 856 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (finding evidence of repeated adultery not sufficient to show extreme
and outrageous conduct); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 607-08 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (holding eleven-year adulterous affair not suffi-
ciently extreme and outrageous to satisfy the conduct element of an emotional
distress cause of action); Alexander v. Inman, 825 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1991) (extramarital affairs inappropriate and unacceptable but not beyond
the bounds of decency).
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abusive spouse should be liable both civilly and criminally under the
same standard of care as an unmarried individual. Thus, battery
claims are generally available to spouses who suffer physical injury
at the hands of their spouse.5 6 When a claim for emotional distress
accompanies a claim for battery or replaces a time-barred claim for
battery, it is usually allowed to proceed. 7 However, spousal claims
for emotional distress based on lIED alone or other torts such as
defamation, invasion of privacy, and fraud, are less successful.
These so-called pure emotional distress claims are less often
successful because of policy arguments similar to those once used to
support interspousal immunity and to reject RED. The arguments
start from the premise that it is unseemly for courts to intrude into
the family sphere and that it is inappropriate or impossible for courts
to try to remedy the harms that occur there.58 Thus, courts seek to
avoid inquiry into "private" matters of sex, marriage, and family life,
and to preserve marital harmony by requiring spouses to settle these
56. See, e.g., Cater v. Cater, 846 S.W.2d 173 (Ark 1993) (upholding
$350,000 award for spousal battery); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65,
26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (abolishing interspousal immunity and permitting
spousal battery claim); Burns v. Burns, 518 So. 2d 1205 (Miss. 1980) (same);
Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993) (abandoning interspousal immu-
nity in case involving battery with machete); Nobel v. Nobel, 761 P.2d 1369
(Utah 1988) (allowing personal injury claim for wife shot in the head); Town-
send v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (abolishing interspousal in-
munity and permitting wife to recover for being shot in the back).
Although spousal battery claims are usually permitted, they are infre-
quently asserted. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1291-93 (specu-
lating on the reasons for this result).
57. See Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 119 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995) (stating that barred battery claims may provide relevant evidence of
emotional distress).
58. A primary rationale for interspousal tort immunity was that acts within
the family are "private" and not within the realm of the judiciary. This now
seems an equally strong reason for some courts' reluctance to recognize IIED
based on conduct occurring in the home. See Weiner, supra note 51, at 208;
see also Murray & Winslett, supra note 24. As for the rationale that some fa-
milial harms cannot be remedied, see Richard P. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal.
App. 3d 1089, 1094, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (Ct. App. 1988) (barring a tort
action against natural father of children born during plaintiffs marriage is
barred because it is beyond any effective legal remedy); Ira Mark Ellman, The
Place of Fault in a Modem Divorce Law, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 801-02 (stat-
ing that the law cannot compensate unhappy spouses for the emotional losses
resulting from a failed marriage).
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matters between themselves. When children are involved, the poli-
cies of safeguarding the best interests of the children and the legisla-
tively approved rules for child support join the privacy and harmony
concerns.59 In addition, courts express concern about spouses col-
luding for insurance purposes or about a single vengeful spouse plot-
ting to file fraudulent claims. 60 Believing that marital emotional dis-
tress is widespread and that emotional distress damages are easy to
plead, courts worry that too many claims will be based on trivial or
frivolous domestic disputes.6' Because emotional distress is an un-
avoidable part of many divorces, courts point to the difficulty of
proving causation, that is, that the emotional distress was caused by
particular spousal conduct rather than by the whole process of di-
vorce.62 In states with statutes precluding heart balm actions and al-
lowing no-fault divorce, some courts believe that allowing spouses to
sue each other in tort is incompatible with the statutory abolition of
the heart balm torts or the statutory adoption of fault-free provisions
for dissolution, spousal support, and property distribution.63 In states
where courts allow fault to be considered in some dissolution deci-
sions, the courts believe that the divorce process provides sufficient
remedies and that allowing HED claims raises the possibility of dou-
ble recovery.64 Finally, when spousal emotional distress claims are
59. See Richard P., 202 Cal. App. 3dat 1095-96, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
60. See, e.g., Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39, 47 (Minn. 1990) (expressing
fear that the new tort of interference with custodial rights might be used as "a
weapon for revenge and continued hostility").
61. See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324-25 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991) (expressing fear that claims will be based on "typical marital disputes,
taxing judicial resources").
62. See, e.g., id. at 1325; Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 1985)
(Michael, J., concurring) (stating that because "it is hard to envision any situa-
tion between two parties more likely to create emotional distress than the dete-
rioration of the domestic relationship between a husband and wife," it is a
given that actions by a spouse "in derogation of the marital relationship will
produce an emotional distress in the other spouse").
63. See Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987) (stat-
ing that plaintiff cannot circumvent no-fault by attempting to obtain a division
of marital property based on fault); Koestler v. Pollard, 471 N.W.2d 7, 12
(Wis. 1991) (barring an IIED action by a husband against the biological father
of a child born during the marriage on the grounds that allowing it to proceed
would undermine the policy behind statutory abolition of the action for crimi-
nal conversation).
64. See Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 625 (Tex. 1993).
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based on statements made during dissolution proceedings, allowing
them to proceed may conflict with the policy of protecting communi-
cations in judicial proceedings to safeguard access to the courts. 65
A. Recognition Compelled by Logic
Compelled by the logic inherent in abrogating interspousal im-
munity and recognizing IIED, the Maine, Oregon, and Texas Su-
preme Courts have recognized emotional distress claims based on
conduct occurring in a marital relationship.66 Although the Texas
opinion recognized that such a claim could be made, the claim in that
lawsuit failed to satisfy the outrageous conduct element of the tort.67
The element was satisfied in the Oregon and Maine lawsuits by al-
leging conduct that included battery. 68 Following the same logical
path, a number of lower state courts have recognized that spousal
emotional distress claims can be stated, either in a dissolution pro-
ceeding or in a separate action, or that they have been stated in a
particular case, usually those involving physical contact or physical
injury.
69
The Maine Supreme Court decision typifies the outcome in
cases involving battery. In Henriksen v. Cameron,70 a former wife
sued her former husband for IED based on physical violence
65. See infra Part IV.
66. See Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993); Davis v. Bos-
tick, 580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978); Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619.
67. See Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 620-21.
68. The Oregon Supreme Court recognized an lIED cause of action in a
lawsuit involving repeated physical violence that occurred after the parties
separated but before their divorce. See Davis, 580 P.2d 544. The complaint
sufficiently alleged outrageous conduct based on allegations that the husband
broke his wife's nose, choked her, made threatening and abusive phone calls to
her home and office, threatened to kill her and her male friends, and destroyed
property. See id. at 545-46; see also Henriksen, 622 A.2d 1135 (allowing IIED
claim against former husband who was physically abusive during the mar-
riage).
69. See Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (stating
lIED can and should be pursued in a separate action). But see Whelan v.
Whelan, 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. Ct 1991) (stating that IED is a viable
claim between spouses); Ruprecht v. Ruprecht 599 A.2d 604 (N.J. Super. Ct.
CIL Div. 1991) (holding that a spouse may sue the other in a divorce action for
IED even in the absence of physical injury).
70. 622A.2d 1135 (Me. 1993).
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accompanying verbal abuse during the marriage. 7 ' The wife did not
plead causes of action for assault and battery, apparently because the
six assaults and three rapes she alleged were barred by the statute of
limitations for assault and battery.72 At least one of the incidents oc-
curred within the statute of limitations for RED.73 Although Maine
had abolished interspousal immunity in an earlier decision, the court
said that the "special nature of the marital relationship" might pro-
vide a privilege for some conduct between husband and wife.74 The
court stated this is due to "the mutual concessions that may be im-
plicit in the marital relationship . . .even though such conduct as
between persons not married to each other may not be so re-
garded.'75 Despite the possibility of such privilege, the court held
that physical violence, accompanied by verbal abuse, intended to in-
flict emotional distress is not immune merely because the parties
were married to each other when that violence occurred.76 The court
rejected various public policy arguments. First, in a case brought
after a divorce, "there is clearly no marital harmony remaining to be
preserved.,77 Second, the threat of excessive and frivolous litigation
intruding into the marital lives of the parties is safeguarded by the
required showing of extreme and outrageous conduct.78 Third, the
possibility of double recovery does not exist because no other provi-
sions of Maine law provided compensatory relief for such injury.79
In Twyman v. TwKyman, 80 a divided Texas Supreme Court recog-
nized the tort of IED and that it could occur in the marital context.8 '
71. See id. at 1137.
72. See id. at 1142.
73. The appellate court approved the trial court's allowing evidence of an
earlier battery on the theory that it was introduced for the purposes of estab-
lishing the defendant's intent and the plaintiff's reasonableness in believing
any threats made by the defendant See id. at 1143.
74. Id. at 1138.
75. Id. (quoting MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 n.5 (Me.
1980)).
76. See id.
77. Id. at 1139.
78. See id. at 1139-40.
79. See id. at 1140.
80. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
81. See id. at 624. The Texas Supreme Court disapproved of the holding in
Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. 1989), which had refused to rec-
ognize IIED as a separate cause of action in a divorce suit on the grounds that
465
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After expressly adopting TIED and noting that Texas had abolished
interspousal immunity as to any cause of action in 1987, the plurality
opinion concluded without further explanation that no legal impedi-
ment existed to bringing the tort claim in a divorce action.82 Mrs.
Twyman included her claim for emotional harm in her divorce peti-
tion, but did not specify whether it was based on negligent or IED.
She claimed that her husband "intentionally and cruelly" attempted
to engage her in sadomasochistic sexual acts even though he knew
that she had been raped at knifepoint before their marriage.8 3 The
trial court awarded her $15,000 for emotional distress, apparently on
the basis of negligent infliction of emotional distress.8 4 The court of
appeals affirmed, holding that the wife could recover for the hus-
band's negligent infliction of emotional distress.8 5 Because it had
recently refused to adopt negligent infliction of emotional distress as
an independent tort, the Texas Supreme Court remanded for a new
trial on the TED cause of action.8 6 Turning to what it viewed as the
more difficult question of when the tort claim must be brought, the
court encouraged joinder of tort claims with the divorce action to
doing so would revive the shortcomings associated with fault grounds for di-
vorce. See Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 624 n.15. For a detailed analysis of Twy-
man, see Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly
Causing Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST.
MARY's L.J. 1253 (1994). For a detailed analysis of Chiles, see David Pfeuf-
fer, Note, Chiles v. Chiles: Divorce, Torts, and Scandal - Texas Style, 42
BAYLOR L. REv. 309 (1990).
82. See Twyman 855 S.W.2d at 624. Five members of the court agreed on
reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, which had been based on re-
cently overruled precedent recognizing a negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress cause of action. Three justices formed a plurality recognizing IED in the
marital context and remanding for a new trial. A fourth justice would have
recognized IED but not in the marital context Two justices would not have
recognized IED at all. Two more judges would have recognized IED in the
marital context but would have affirmed the court of appeals judgment See id.
at 622 n.4. Distinguishing Davis v. Bostick and Henriksen v. Cameron as in-
volving physical abuse and threats, the justice who would have recognized
flED but not in the marital context said that emotional distress resulting from
physical attack or threat of attack is already compensable under other tort theo-
ries. See id. at 628 (Phillips, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
83. See id. at 620-21 &n.1.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 625-26.
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avoid two trials.8 7 The court also cautioned trial courts to guard
against double recovery, a possibility since Texas allows the fault of
the parties to be considered in dividing the marital estate; thus, theo-
retically a spouse could recover tort damages and a disproportionate
share of the community estate based on the same conduct. 88
B. Rejection Based on Public Policy
The highest state courts of New York and South Dakota have
expressly rejected a spousal RED cause of action on public policy
grounds, as have several intermediate appellate courts.89 In Weicker
v. Weicker,9' a New York Court of Appeals case, the court held that
public policy precluded causes of action growing out of matrimonial
disputes. A woman sued her husband and his purported new wife for
intentional infliction of mental distress and for injunctive relief to
prevent the defendants from holding themselves out to be husband
and wife.91 The plaintiff claimed that she suffered emotional distress
87. See id. at 624-25.
88. See id. Several years later, the Texas Supreme Court held that a spouse
could not bring a separate and independent tort action for actual fraud and pu-
nitive damages based on deprivation of community assets; instead, such fraud
should be considered in the division of community property. See Schlueter v.
Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998). Unlike IIED, the court said that a
wronged spouse has an adequate remedy for such fraud through the "just and
right" property division upon divorce. See id. at 587-88. The majority distin-
guished the result in Twyman on the basis that redress was not available
through the divorce action for intentional torts involving personal injuries; the
dissent disagreed, saying redress for personal injuries is available through un-
even division of the community estate. See id. at 590-91 (Hecht, J., dissent-
ing).
89. See, e.g., Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct App. 1979).
In Browning, a husband sued his wife for IIED and her lover for alienation of
affections. The court held that one spouse may not sue the other for emotional
distress damages caused by "openly consorting' with another party. The court
declined to recognize HIED without physical contact in any context However,
the case is sometimes cited in support of a public policy exception for IIED in
the marital context because of its statements that "public policy would not be
served by authorizing the recovery of damages under the circumstances al-
leged" and that "the morals of mankind are more perfectly judged by a court
having a final and eternal jurisdiction." Id. at 408; see also Koestler v. Pollard,
471 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Wis. 1991) (barring an RED action because allowing it
would undermine the policy behind statutory abolition of heart balm claims).
90. 237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968).
91. See id. at 876-77.
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because her husband procured a Mexican divorce decree and "mar-
ried" another woman, and that the couple then held themselves out to
be husband and wife. Without elaboration, the New York Court of
Appeals held that public policy barred an IED claim that related to a
"dispute arising out of matrimonial differences." 92 The wife's claim,
the court said, "would result in a revival of evils not unlike those
which prompted the Legislature in 1935 to outlaw actions for aliena-
tion of affections and criminal conversation.,
93
In Pickering v. Pickering,94 the South Dakota Supreme Court
rejected spousal emotional distress and fraud claims based on "con-
duct which leads to the dissolution of a marriage," such as a wife's
revelation to her husband that he was not the father of her child.95 In
Pickering, Mrs. Pickering had an affair with a co-worker and became
pregnant; she then seduced her husband so that he would believe he
was the father.96 About four months after the birth of her daughter,
Mrs. Pickering told her husband the truth.97 Mr. Pickering filed for
divorce and sued Mrs. Pickering for fraud and IIED; he sued his
wife's lover for lIED and alienation of affections. 98 In addition to
maternity and child care expenses, Mr. Pickering sought damages for
the "untold humiliation, embarrassment, and emotional scarring" that
he suffered because he had been kept in the dark and had told people
that he was the child's father.99
The majority affirmed the dismissal of all the causes of action
except the one for alienation of affections against the lover. 100
92. Id. at 876-77.
93. Id. at 877. The court said the request for injunctive relief was barred by
the same public policy and because such decrees in domestic affairs cannot be
enforced. See id. New York courts have construed Weicker to proscribe
spousal claims for HED only when the basis for the claim is "a mere matrimo-
nial dispute." See Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (N.Y. App. Div.
1985) (affirming finding of outrageous conduct on evidence of threats, use of
force, assaults, and general abusive conduct between unmarried cohabitants,
but holding that the circumstances did not constitute a mere matrimonial dis-
pute).
94. 434 N.W.2d 758 (S.D. 1989).
95. Id. at 761.
96. See id. at 759-60.
97. See id. at 760.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 761 &n.1.
100. See id. at 763.
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Noting that South Dakota provides a remedy for such a claim against
a third party, the court held that an lIED claim against a spouse
"should be unavailable as a matter of public policy when it is predi-
cated on conduct which leads to the dissolution of a marriage."'' 1
The court also barred the husband's actions for fraud and deceit since
they were beyond any effective legal remedy and thus an inappropri-
ate subject matter for court intervention; in addition, allowing it to
proceed might cause significant harm to the child.'0 2 In his partial
dissent, Justice Henderson wrote that he would allow the husband to
bring an IIED action against the lover but that
where man and wife are involved in a marriage relationship,
there could always exist a tort for intentional infliction of
emotional distress where they had an argument. It could be
over the family dog, who takes out the garbage, who forgot
to pay the bill, or who is spending too much money.
0 3
Finally, in Steve H. v. Wendy S.,104 the most comprehensive
opinion rejecting a spousal emotional distress cause of action on the
basis of public policy, the California Court of Appeal for the Second
District decided to bar an IED claim based on the wife's attempt to
terminate the husband's parental rights during a dissolution pro-
ceeding. 0 5 The four public policy grounds for this decision--the in-
appropriateness of compensation for the creation of a close relation-
ship with a child, 0 6 the possibility of harm to the best interests of the
101. Id. at 761. Again in 1999, the South Dakota Supreme Court refused to
abolish the statutorily derived cause of action for alienation of affections. See
Veeder v. Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610 (S.D. 1999).
102. See Pickering, 434 N.W.2d at 761-62 (relying on Richard P. v. Superior
Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 249 Cal. Rptr. 246 (Ct App. 1988)). "Allowing
Paul to maintain this cause of action may cause Jody's and Tom's daughter to
suffer significant harm. This innocent party, who is now three years old,
should not be subjected to this type of 'interfamilial warfare."' Id. at 762.
103. Id. at 764 (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). An-
other justice criticized the majority for denying recovery based on "an unex-
pressed public policy." Id. at 765 (Sabers, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). This justice noted that the trial court had allowed the husband to re-
cover maternity and child care expenses, a decision that none of the parties ap-
pealed. See id.
104. 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90 (Ct App. 1997).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 93.
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child if the claim were allowed to proceed, 10 7 the frequency of con-
duct causing emotional distress during dissolution proceedings, 0 8
and the policies underlying abolition of the heart balm claims' 9-
will be examined further in sections EII and IV.
C. Balancing Logic and Limits
Believing that domestic emotional distress is pervasive and of-
ten trivial, courts and commentators have proposed various means
for distinguishing the everyday from the extreme."10 The difficulty
of doing so is illustrated by the very different conclusions reached in
a Texas case"' decided a few months after Twyman, and in a New
Mexico case 1 2 decided the same year. In the New Mexico decision,
Hakkila v. Hakkila,13 the court suggested that judges adopt a very
high threshold for what constitutes extreme and outrageous behavior
in the marital context and suggested granting summary judgment
107. See id. at 93-94.
108. See id. at 94-95.
109. See id. at 95-96.
110. Tort law attempts to balance the policy of compensation against the fear
that defendants will be held accountable for "injuries disproportionate to their
causal participation and that tort liability on an institutional scale will spin out
of control. An unceasing tension exists between compensating plaintiffs and
limiting the liability of defendants." Levit, supra note 24, at 164.
This tension has been a special concern for courts deciding spousal IIED
claims:
[C]onduct intentionally or recklessly causing emotional distress to
one's spouse is prevalent in our society. This is unfortunate but per-
haps not surprising, given the length and intensity of the marital rela-
tionship..... Thus, if the tort of outrage is construed loosely or
broadly, claims of outrage may be tacked on in typical marital dis-
putes, taxing judicial resources.
Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324-25 (N.M. Ct App. 1991).
Both the Hakkila court and the Henriksen court advocated liberal grant-
ing of summary judgment to dispose of frivolous claims. See id. at 1327; Hen-
riksen, 622 A.2d 1135, 1139-49 (Me. 1993). The Hakkila opinion is examined
in detail in Heather S. Call, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in the
Marital Context: Hakkila v. Hakldila, 23 N.M. L. Rsv. 387 (1993).
111. See Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App. 1991), writ denied,
867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993). See Ellman, supra note 19, at 797-801, for a
detailed criticism of the Massey decision.
112. See Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
113. See id.
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when spousal claims fail to cross the threshold." 4 Mrs. Hakkila did
not achieve this threshold despite evidence of several incidents of as-
sault and battery, including the times her husband threw her across
the room, slammed a camper shell on her head, and closed a trunk lid
on her hand."' Instead, the court concluded that the merits of Mrs.
Hakkila's claim should have been disposed of summarily, saving her
husband from having to go through a six-day trial surveying the
"rights and wrongs" of their marriage."
6
In contrast, there were no allegations of physical abuse in
Massey v. Massey," 7 but Mr. Massey was described as angry, threat-
ening, and explosive." 8 He had temper tantrums and physical out-
bursts in which he destroyed property, kept tight control over fi-
nances, and threatened to tell people about his wife's affair and to
take custody of their children.119 The Texas Court of Appeals upheld
a jury award of $362,000 for the wife's emotional distress. 20 When
the case reached the Texas Supreme Court, the majority agreed with
the appellate court, finding that an RED claim existed.' 2' In dissent,
Justice Hecht wrote that "[i]t is certainly possible to view [the hus-
band's] conduct as outrageous ... [i]t is also possible to view his
conduct as reprehensible, demeaning and intimidating to [his wife],
and destructive of their marriage-but not 'outrageous.' Which view
114. See id. at 1326-27.
115. Mrs. Hakkila did not plead any assault and battery causes of action. See
id. at 1321-22. In addition to those incidents, the trial court found that her
husband insulted and screamed at her at home and in the presence of others,
locked her out of their residence overnight, made repeated demeaning and abu-
sive remarks, refused to allow her to pursue schooling and hobbies, and re-
fused to participate in normal marital relations. See id. at 1321. There was
some indication that had she claimed damages for assault and battery, the re-
sult would have been different See id. at 1330 (Donnelly, J., specially concur-
ring).
116. Id. at 1327.
117. 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct App. 1991), writ denied, 867 S.W.2d 766
(Tex. 1993).
118. Seeid. at399.
119. See id. at399-400.
120. See id. at 400.
121. See Massey v. Massey, 867 S.W.2d 766, 766 (Tex. 1993) [hereinafter
Massey II].
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is correct? The answer depends entirely upon the personal opinions
of the person asked to decide." 122
1. The problem with the Restatement formula
Today, the Restatement (Second) of Torts describes the tort of
IIED as follows: "One who by extreme and outrageous conduct in-
tentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another
is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm
to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.' 123 Under the Re-
statement, the element of extreme and outrageous conduct functions
as the community's gatekeeper, and therefore its definition remains
critical and elusive. The definition a court uses is critical because the
court must decide, on a case-by-case basis, what conduct is so so-
cially intolerable that its victims should be compensated. A defini-
tion has traditionally been elusive because the proscribed behavior
cannot be specifically described, nor can custom supply external
standards. As a result, the tort is said to be so indeterminate that
even if people wanted to alter their behavior to comply, they proba-
bly could not do so.'
24
Although the tort ostensibly has four elements, extreme and out-
rageous conduct both "limits the reach of the tort and dominates the
proof.' ' 5 Even if the defendant intends to and does inflict emotional
distress, the defendant incurs no liability unless the plaintiff proves
the conduct was extreme and outrageous. Once the plaintiff proves
extreme and outrageous conduct, the nature of the conduct it-
self may be used to provide evidence of the defendant's intent, the
plaintiffs severe emotional distress, and the conduct causing the
122. Id. at 767 (Hecht, J., dissenting). Contrast this with the result in Miller
v. Ratner, 688 A.2d 976, 996 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1997). There, the plaintiff
and defendant lived together for three years. Seriously ill with breast cancer
and undergoing radiation treatments, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
would repeatedly wake her up in the middle of the night, urge her to leave, tell
her that she was a financial burden and would soon die, and threaten her with
bodily harm if she did not leave. See id. The court held that these verbal ac-
tions were not of "such egregiousness so as to satisfy the elements of the tort."
Id. at 996.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
124. See Givelber, supra note 41, at 56, 75.
125. Id.
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distress.' 26 This collapsing of the tort's elements into a sole determi-
nation of outrageous conduct is made possible by the Restatement's
commentary. 1
27
The first element of the Restatement's formula for IED is in-
tentional or reckless conduct. The Restatement standard for intention
applies where the actor desires to inflict severe emotional
distress, and also where he knows that such distress is cer-
tain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct. It
applies also where he acts recklessly ... in deliberate disre-
gard of a high degree of probability that the emotional dis-
tress will follow.
28
Under this standard as interpreted by the courts, when the defendant
behaves outrageously, the plaintiff will not be required to show other
facts as evidence of either the intention to cause distress or a deliber-
ate disregard of a high degree of probability that it will result. 129 The
intent element has been interpreted as referring to whether the defen-
dant intended to act in a manner that can be considered extreme and
outrageous, and intended or knew that the conduct would affect the
plaintiff; if so, the defendant will be liable if he or she knew or
should have known that emotional distress was the likely result.'3"
As a result, the plaintiff can establish both the conduct and the intent
elements by showing that the defendant consciously engaged in out-
rageous conduct aimed at the plaintiff, without proving that the de-
fendant knew or intended the consequences of his conduct.1
3'
The second element of HED requires the plaintiff to suffer se-
vere emotional distress. Because "[c]omplete emotional tranquillity
is seldom attainable in this world," the law should not intervene
126. See id. at 46-49.
127. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965) ("[I]n
many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is
in itself important evidence that the distress has existed."). "[I]f the enormity
of the outrage carries conviction that there has in fact been severe emotional
distress, bodily harm is not required.". Id. cmt. k.
128. Id. § 46 cmt. i. An actor is reckless when he "knows or has reason to
know... of facts which create a high degree of risk of physical harm to an-
other, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard
of, or indifference to, that risk." Id. § 500 cmt. a.
129. See Givelber, supra note 41, at 46-47.
130. See id.
131. See id.
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unless the distress is "so severe that no reasonable [person] could be
expected to endure it."' 132 Nonetheless, "in many cases the extreme
and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself im-
portant evidence that the distress has existed.', 133 Moreover, "if the
enormity of the outrage carries conviction that there has in fact been
severe emotional distress, bodily harm is not required.' ' 134  Thus,
courts have found the severe emotional distress element to be satis-
fied by the outrageousness of the conduct, rather than requiring proof
of the extent of the suffering as an element of the tort.'
35
The third element of the tort looks to whether the conduct
caused the distress. The Restatement authors offer no special expla-
nation of the causation requirement in the IED context. Again, Pro-
fessor Givelber points out that if evidence of outrageous conduct can
support a conclusion that the plaintiff's suffering was severe, "this
evidence necessarily permits a finding that the conduct caused suf-
fering.' '5 36 In contrast to lawsuits involving physical injuries, where
both the cause and extent of the injuries often must be proven by ex-
pert testimony, the question of causation in HlED cases sometimes
relies on the plaintiff s statement that the defendant's conduct caused
his distress.
137
That leaves extreme and outrageous conduct, the concept into
which the elements of intent, injury, and causation have been
merged. Despite its centrality, extreme and outrageous conduct does
not describe a specific act that can be objectively measured but is in-
stead "an evaluation of behavior."' 38 Thus, the Restatement states:
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).
133. Id.
134. Id. cmt. k. For example, "A organizes a mob, and brings it to B's door
at night. A tells B that unless he leaves town within ten days the mob will re-
turn and lynch him. B suffers severe emotional distress, but no physical con-
sequences. A is subject to liability to B." Id. cmt. k, illus. 20.
135. See Givelber, supra note 41, at 47-48.
136. Id. at 49.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 51. Unlike other evaluations of behavior that juries are called
upon to make, the determination of what constitutes extreme and outrageous
conduct is not the subject of testimony by expert witnesses about established
standards. As one judge put it: "[W]hat standard is [the jury] to use? None
can be given them. No evidence can be offered or instruction given about what
is 'utterly intolerable in a civilized community."' Massey 1, 867 S.W.2d at
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Liability has been found only where the conduct has been
so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to
go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Generally, the case is one in which the recita-
tion of the facts to an average member of the community
would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him
to exclaim, "Outrageous!' ' 3 9
Recognizing that this description amounts to saying that pornog-
raphy is "Obscene!", the Restatement authors explain:
[L]iability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indigni-
ties, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivi-
alities. The rough edges of our society are still in need of a
good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs
must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to
a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no
occasion for the law to intervene in every case where some
one's [sic] feelings are hurt. There must still be freedom to
express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must
be left through which irascible tempers may blow off rela-
tively harmless steam.'
40
The Restatement illustrations provide little clarification: lies
and practical jokes are sometimes actionable while most insults are
not.' 4' But "where there is a special relation between the parties...
767 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
140. Id.
141. For example, "As a practical joke, A falsely tells B that her husband has
been badly injured in an accident and is in the hospital with both legs broken.
B suffers severe emotional distress. A is subject to liability to B for her emo-
tional distress." Id. cmt. d, illus. 1. As for insults:
A makes a telephone call but is unable to get his number. In the
course of an altercation with the telephone operator, A calls her a God
damned woman, a God damned liar, and says that if he were there he
would break her God damned neck. B suffers severe emotional dis-
tress, broods over the incident, is unable to sleep, and is made ill. A's
conduct although insulting, is not so outrageous or extreme as to
make A liable to B.
Id. cmt. d, illus. 4.
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there may be recovery for insults not amounting to extreme out-
rage." 42  Moreover, conduct not otherwise outrageous may be
viewed as extreme and outrageous because the actor abuses a posi-
tion or a relationship that gives him actual or apparent authority or
the power to affect the plaintiff's interests. 43
As the Restatement comments illustrate, the context in which
the conduct occurs has been crucial in determining whether the con-
duct is extreme and outrageous. The tort often has been used in
commercial or employment settings, to alleviate the unequal bar-
gaining position of one of the parties in a voluntary agreement or to
require the defendant who was in a position of power to treat the
plaintiff with a "minimum level of decency."' 4 4  When the claim
As more than one critic has pointed out, the problem with these illustra-
tions is that while many people would agree that one or more of them involves
outrageous conduct, they most likely would disagree about which ones. See,
e.g., Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 631 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., con-
curring & dissenting).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
143. See id. cmt. e. Such a special relationship is usually found in cases in-
volving police officers, school authorities, landlords, and collecting creditors.
In such situations, bullying conduct apparently is actionable. See id. For ex-
ample:
A, the principal of a high school, summons B, a schoolgirl, to his of-
fice, and abruptly accuses her of immoral conduct with various men.
A bullies B for an hour, and threatens her with prison and with public
disgrace for herself and her parents unless she confesses. B suffers
severe emotional distress, and resulting illness. A is subject to liabil-
ity to B for both.
Id. cmt. e, illus. 6.
Similarly:
A, a creditor, seeking to collect a debt from B, sends B a series of let-
ters in lurid envelopes bearing a picture of lightning about to strike, in
which A repeatedly threatens suit without bringing it, reviles B as a
deadbeat, a dishonest man, and a criminal, and threatens to garnish his
wages, to bother his employer so much that B will be discharged, and
to "tie B up tight as a drunk' if he does not pay. B suffers severe
emotional distress. A is subject to liability to B.
Id. cmt. e, illus. 7.
144. Givelber, supra note 41, at 68-72. Professor Givelber concluded that
although the tort would probably never provide "the basis for principled adju-
dication, it has provided and probably will continue to provide the basis for
achieving situational justice" because it "adds to the bundle of rights of those
who occupy the typically weaker bargaining position" in a relationship in
which the parties are bound by a voluntary agreement. Id. at 75, 68-69.
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involves parties not previously bound by contract, which is the case
in marriage despite the presence of an agreement, "the results [are]
more unpredictable, and doctrine virtually nonexistent."'
145
In addition to abuse of a position or a relationship of power, two
other Restatement comments seem particularly relevant to spousal
emotional distress claims. The first appears to make it easier for
spouses to prove extreme and outrageous conduct because it provides
that conduct not otherwise outrageous may become so when the actor
knows that "the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress,
by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity."'
146
The second appears to recognize a defense of sorts for defendant
spouses because it provides that conduct, although extreme and out-
rageous, may be excused. 147 "The actor is never liable, for example,
where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights ....
[T]here may perhaps be situations in which the actor is privileged"
because of circumstances which minimize or remove the outrage.
148
2. Proposals to limit liability
Hoping to limit liability to "culpable acts which are above and
beyond the usual acts of cruelty arising in situations of marital dis-
cord,"'149 courts and commentators have developed three main ap-
proaches. First, the privilege approach requires case-by-case
145. Id. at 63.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. f (1965). "[Clonduct
may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the
face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know." Id.
Thus:
A, who knows that B is pregnant, intentionally shoots before the eyes
of B a pet dog, to which A knows that B is greatly attached. B suffers
severe emotional distress, which results in a miscarriage. A is subject
to liability to B for the distress and for the miscarriage.
Id. cmt. t illus. 11.
But:
A is an otherwise normal girl who is a little overweight, and is quite
sensitive about it Knowing this, B tells A that she looks like a hippo-
potamus. This causes A to become embarrassed and angry. She
broods over the incident, and is made ill. B is not liable to A.
Id. cmt. f, illus. 13.
147. See id. cmt. g.
148. Id.
149. Schwartz, supra note 25, at 223.
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balancing of the plaintiffs injury against the defendant's interests.
Second, the gatekeeper approach keeps out meritless claims and al-
lows judges to avoid determining what is extreme and outrageous on
a case-by-case basis. Finally, the per se approach applies clear and
certain rules, which also allows judges to avoid case-by-case inquir-
ies.
a. privilege
The authors of the 1948 Restatement adopted a privilege ap-
proach to iED.150 Some have suggested a modification of that ap-
proach.' 5' The privilege applies when the defendant engages in ac-
tionable conduct that furthers an interest of such social importance
that it is protected even in the face of harm to the plaintiff.'52 Under
the 1948 Restatement formulation, the plaintiff would presumably
prove the elements of the tort-which were only the intentional
causing of severe emotional distress--and the defendant would then
prove the privilege. Such an approach makes it easier for the plain-
tiff to establish a prima facie case, but it also encourages "the devel-
opment of greater precision with respect to when it is socially appro-
priate to inflict serious emotional distress on others" by forcing
courts to be specific about when a defendant's interests justify the
150. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW § 46 (Supp. 1948).
151. California courts have consistently held that the defendant's conduct
must be shown to be unprivileged, whether that proof is treated as an element
of the tort or as a defense. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10
Cal. App. 3d 376, 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 88-90 (Ct. App. 1970) (examining de-
fendant's contention that conduct was privileged because it constituted settle-
ment negotiations).
In addition to setting a "high threshold" for what constitutes extreme and
outrageous conduct, the Hakkila court suggested that some emotionally dis-
tressing conduct is "privileged" and should be protected because it serves the
need for spouses to vent emotions, the sometimes useful purposes of intention-
ally making another person unhappy or upset, or the liberty interest in ex-
pressing a personal opinion or engaging in a personal relationship. See Hak-
kila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324-25 (N.M. Ct App. 1991).
152. This concept is different from the "privilege" that is sometimes sug-
gested as a way of taking into account the mutual concessions implied in a
marriage. The latter kind of privilege is closer to consent, an implied agree-
ment that some acts that would be torts between strangers should not be torts
between spouses and that liability should be limited to situations where "a
clear abuse of marital privilege exists." See Spector, supra note 49, at 72.
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conduct and when a defendant has gone too far in pursuit of his in-
terests.
153
Recognizing the addition of extreme and outrageous conduct to
the Restatement definition, an addition adopted by most states, the
author of one of the first articles on domestic torts recommended a
modified privilege approach that would balance the plaintiffs and
the defendant's interests to determine whether the defendant's con-
duct was outrageous.154 An explicit balancing of interests is more
precise than determining whether conduct "looks" outrageous be-
cause it evaluates the interests at stake in a situation that is difficult
to assess because of the relationship of the parties.' 55 By comparing
the interests the defendant promotes with the interests being harmed,
courts might also avoid the problem of judicial reluctance to inquire
into the "intimate nature of familial interaction and the attendant no-
tions of one's implied consent to such relationships."'156 Instead, the
outrageousness requirement can be met when the "defendant violates
an established right of plaintiff or abrogates an established duty owed
to plaintiff," a duty established by the courts or the legislature.
57
Coupled with this balancing approach and concerned about the
amorphous nature of "outrageous conduct," Professor Cole also sug-
gested that courts focus first on the intent, causation, and severity
elements, that is, on "whether or not defendant intended to and has,
in fact, caused plaintiff serious mental distress."'5 8 Such a focus
could eliminate some complaints, and therefore the need for a
153. See Givelber, supra note 41, at 61.
154. See Charles B. Hochman, "Outrageousness" and Privilege in the Law
ofEmotional Distress-a Suggestion, 47 CoRNELLL.Q. 61 (1961).
155. See Cole, supra note 50, at 572.
156. Id. As an example, Professor Cole cited a case in which the defendant's
constitutionally protected right to seek an abortion outweighed the plaintiffs
interest in being free from emotional disturbance. See Przybyla v. Przybyla,
275 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a woman's exercise of
constitutional right to abortion cannot be considered extreme and outrageous
conduct).
157. Cole, supra note 50, at 573. Other commentators have criticized Cole's
approach to balancing the parties' interests, saying that it does not seem satis-
factory "except for the easy cases." Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at
1341 n.300. Ellman and Sugarman disagree specifically with Cole's use of
duties implied from civil statutes. See id.
158. Cole, supra note 50, at 571.
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case-by-case inquiry into outrage: distress, for example, will often
be temporary. 159 Professor Cole's suggestion that early application
of the intent element might limit the need to inquire into outrageous-
ness appears to be supported by cases such as Vance v. Vance.' 60 In
Vance, the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a husband's negli-
gent misrepresentation that he was divorced at the time of his mar-
riage did not satisfy the intent required for IIED.' 6' Mrs. Vance
sought damages for emotional distress suffered because of the con-
cealment and then the revelation of her invalid marital status. Dr.
Vance discovered the misrepresentation within a month of making it,
but he did not tell his wife until he sought to annul their marriage
twenty years later.' 62 The court concluded:
[T]here was no evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that in 1956, when Dr. Vance told Muriel that he
was free to marry her, that he could or should have antici-
pated that under the circumstances existing some twenty
years later, he would reveal what he previously concealed
and cause Muriel to suffer severe emotional distress. Thus,
Dr. Vance did not have any knowledge of what his con-
cealment would likely occasion, and therefore the record
fails to disclose any evidence in support of the first or sec-
ond elements of the tort.1
6 3
159. Seeid. &n.153.
160. 408 A.2d 728 (Md. 1979).
161. See id. at 737.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 737. In a case reaching the same conclusion, Mr. Fletcher sued
Ms. Ruth for IED when she ended his visitation and disproved his paternity of
her five-year-old child. See Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412 (Va. 1989). The
court said Ms. Ruth's conduct was not intentional or reckless because "[t]here
is no proof that she set out to convince [Mr. Fletcher] that the child was his,
and to cause him to develop a loving relationship with the child so that in the
end, she could hurt [Mr. Fletcher] by taking the child away from him forever.
Such proof was required to satisfy the 'intentional or reckless' prong." Id. at
416. The mother had doubts about the child's paternity, but no real knowl-
edge, and she did not continue her affair with the biological father. See id. at
413-15.
Finally, in Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1991), the court found that the wife's adulterous affair during the last
eleven years of their marriage was not outrageous, but also noted that the wife
committed no intentional act designed to cause her husband to suffer severe
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b. gatekeeper
The 1965 Restatement authors replaced "privilege" with "ex-
treme and outrageous conduct" because of the "need for a more lim-
ited statement which will set some boundaries to the liability," 64 By
its extraordinary nature, outrageousness would act as a gatekeeper
and help judges avoid adjudicating everyday disputes. Reflecting
this concern, courts facing spousal IIED claims devised various tests
for evaluating outrageousness. For example, the Massey trial court
suggested that juries follow a "this marriage" test to determine what
constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct, instructing the jury that
"[t]he bounds of decency vary from legal relationship to legal rela-
tionship.' 65 Because "[c]onduct considered extreme and outrageous
in some relationships may be considered forgivable in other relation-
ships..., you shall consider [the claims made] only in the context of
the marital relationship of the parties to this case."' 66 This jury in-
struction runs counter to the Restatement's emphasis on social con-
sensus and does not accomplish its apparent purpose of protecting
the private understandings of the parties. Instead, it would require a
"deep intrusion into the spouses' intimate affairs" to determine what
standards the parties set for themselves.
167
emotional distress. "Nothing was done by her to make the incidents known to
him. In fact, she kept it a secret from him for the 11 years." Id.
164. Givelber, supra note 41, at 62 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46, reporter's note (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1957)). The outrageous-
ness limit has been justified on the basis that it guards against the danger of too
many claims based on common behavior, helps prove that the plaintiffs suf-
feting is genuine, protects the defendant's liberty interests, and allows for the
instances in which upsetting conduct is justified in pursuit of the defendant's
legal rights or some social or personal interest. See id. at 57.
165. Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), writ de-
nied, 867 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993).
166. Id. Neither the intermediate appellate court nor the Texas Supreme
Court disturbed the instruction, although a dissenting justice objected that the
instruction left "the standard by which outrageousness is to be measured [as]
the personal opinion of the person asked to decide." Massey, 867 S.W.2d at
766 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
167. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1321. In addition, individual-
ized marital standards may create liability if, for example, spouses can promise
each other that they will not commit some act that the community condones.
See id. In contrast, the determination of what constitutes outrageous conduct
in commercial interactions can draw on established conventions of public be-
havior as well as on an understanding that both parties have a financial pur-
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Another effort to avoid mundane claims and undue intrusion
into the marriage came in the Hakkila v. Hakkila168 opinion. There,
the New Mexico Court of Appeals held:
[I]n determining when the tort of outrage should be recog-
nized in the marital setting, the threshold of outrageousness
should be set high enough-or the circumstances in which
the tort is recognized should be described precisely enough,
e.g., child snatching ... that the social good from recog-
nizing the tort will not be outweighed by unseemly and in-
vasive litigation of meritless claims.1
69
Apparently ignoring the trial court's finding that the wife had
presented evidence of assault and battery, the court concluded that
"[t]he merits of wife's claim can be disposed of summarily. Hus-
band's insults and outbursts fail to meet the legal standard of outra-
geousness .... He was privileged to refrain from intercourse. There
was no evidence that the other conduct caused severe emotional dis-
tress, as opposed to transient pain or discomfort."1
70
Rejecting "at least for the time being" the argument that public
policy should bar all spousal HED claims, the court said that policy
considerations nevertheless support "a very limited scope for the tort
in the marital context.' 171 These policy considerations include con-
cern that RED claims might be tacked on to "typical" marital dis-
putes, allowing burdensome litigation of the commonplace, that tort
litigation based on intramarital activity might invade the privacy of
accused spouses, and that causation would be problematic because of
the difficulty of connecting particular outrageous conduct to severe
emotional distress.172 Finally, the court pointed to what it saw as a
conflict between the spousal RED action and New Mexico's adop-
tion of no-fault divorce and dissatisfaction with the alienation of
pose. In the marital context, "neither a financial purpose nor conventions of
public conduct provides a compass to guide the tort's application." Ellman,
supra note 19, at 796.
168. 812 P.2d 1320 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
169. Id. at 1326.
170. Id. at 1327.
171. Id. at 1323-24; see also Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135, 1138
(Me. 1993) (suggesting that courts should examine whether particular conduct
may be privileged by "virtue of the mutual concessions that may be implicit in
the marital relationship").
172. Id. at 1325.
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affections cause of action. 173 The Hakkila lawsuit itself illustrated
the risks of allowing RED claims because the "husband was sub-
jected to a six-day trial... surveying the rights and wrongs of a ten-
year marriage."' 174 The court concluded by suggesting that trial
courts use summary judgment to dispose of meritless claims, and
warning that it might be necessary to reconsider the public policy
objections to allowing spousal TIED "if the potential harms from this
kind of litigation are too frequently realized."'175
Although the gatekeeper approach seems attractive, its applica-
tion in the Hakkila decision reveals its shortcomings. The recitation
of the facts found by the trial court, and even the alternate version of
the facts apparently accepted by the appellate court, 17 6 includes con-
duct that if not outrageous, is surely sufficient to support the trial
court's finding that it was.
c. per se rules
Some bright lines have emerged from the case law-battery is
outrageous, except apparently in New Mexico, and adultery is not.
Several commentators have suggested broader rules as a way to pro-
mote determinacy and avoid the need for case-by-case inquiries into
outrageousness. Professors Ellman and Sugarman proposed a per se
rule based on criminal conduct. The spousal IRED claims would ap-
ply only to conduct
that is highly unlikely to have been part of any couple's
mutual understanding, or in any event is sufficiently ma-
levolent to justify overriding these privacy norms ....
[Miarital conduct crosses the line into outrageousness at
just the point when it becomes so extreme that it is not
173. Id. at 1326.
174. Id. at 1327.
175. Id.
176. See Heather S. Call, Note, Tort Law - Intentional Infliction of Emo-
tional Distress in the Marital Context: Hakkila v. Hakkila, 23 N.M. L. REv.
387, 393 (1993) (suggesting that the explanation for the court's refusal to find
extreme and outrageous conduct may lie in its unusual use of both the trial
court's findings of fact and the husband's summaries of the evidence support-
ing the findings).
483
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credible to think it was part of any reasonable couple's
marital understanding. '77
The line of outrageousness, they suggest, is clear only when the
spouse's conduct is criminal.1
7 1
Professors Ellman and Sugarman warn that more routine uses of
IIED claims undermine the no-fault divorce rationale of avoiding re-
criminations and assigning blame when marriages end.179 Second,
they claim that allowing spouses to bring flED claims serves primar-
ily to provide damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages,
rather than to provide compensation for economic losses.' ° Third,
although the authors acknowledge that recognition of spousal IIED
may further the goals of punishment and vengeance, they argue that
it does not deter outrageous conduct both because outrageous con-
duct is so imprecisely defined and because "the strong forces that
turn what once was love into a willingness to deliberately harm an-
other will usually be undeterred by the chance of paying court-
ordered damages to the abused."' 8'1 Fourth, the authors claim that
allowing spousal RED raises judicial complications because of the
need to prevent double recovery and distinguish between the causes
of compensable emotional harm. 82 Finally, the authors believe there
is something unseemly or inappropriate about allowing people to sue
for money when they are emotionally wronged in a marriage. 183
Thus, they conclude that, except when the abusive conduct is crimi-
nal, "the best remedy the law can provide the spouse who feels emo-
tionally endangered or harmed by the marital relationship is its expe-
ditious dissolution, along with his or her share of the accumulated
property and, in the appropriate cases, enforceable support
awards."'18
4
177. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1322-23. The authors suggest
another benefit from specifying conduct like battery: it is "so completely out
of bounds as to permit its condemnation without any need to probe the nuances
of the couple's marital relationship." Id. at 1330.
178. See id. at 1335.
179. See id. at 1285-86.
180. See id. at 1286-89.
181. Id. at 1287.
182. See id. at 1289.
183. See id. at 1290.
184. Id. at 1343. In the specific context of domestic violence, another author
suggested that the willful violation of a civil protection order should constitute
484
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III. INTERFERENCE WITH THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP
AS A BASIS FOR SPOuSALUED: CALIFORNIA'S EARLY AND
CONTINJING REJECTION OF THE TORT
Although California adopted RED in 1952 and abolished inter-
spousal immunity ten years later, only one California appellate deci-
sion has allowed a spousal lED claim based on marital conduct; that
decision merely upheld the claim against an attack based on statutory
privilege. 8 5 The development of California law on this issue illus-
trates the continuing tension between the policy of compensating
victims of wrongful acts, predominant in tort law when physical in-
jury or property damage is alleged, and the policy of limiting liability
within manageable boundaries, predominant in tort law when emo-
tional distress damage is claimed.
A. Background
The first policy--4hat where there is a wrongful act, there should
be liability--prevailed in State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v.
Siliznoff,186 where the California Supreme Court first recognized an
flED action independent of physical injury.'8 7 In Siliznoff, a rubbish
outrage per se, simplifying the determination of outrage and reducing the
plaintiffs burden in proving intent, but leaving intact the elements of severe
emotional distress and causation. See Weiner, supra note 51, at 223. Such a
per se rule expands the remedies for domestic violence victims because it
reaches some conduct, including stalking and psychological abuse, that might
not be criminal under state law. See id. at 189-90 & n.16. It also provides a
remedy for domestic violence victims who cannot establish a battery, but who
suffer threats of future bodily harm or who missed the statute of limitations for
assault and battery. See id. at 192-93. Professors Ellman and Sugarman say
that Weiner's rule is "not unattractive" because of its specificity and because it
is based on criminal conduct. However, they claim it is too restrictive and
suggest that a more suitable solution might be contempt proceedings against
the violator of the civil protection order. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note
16, at 1343 n.300.
185. See Begier v. Stron, 46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 54 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Ct. App.
1996).
186. 38 Cal. 2d330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
187. See id. The case is the basis for one of the Restatement's classic illus-
trations:
A, the president of an association of rubbish collectors, summons B to
a meeting of the association, and in the presence of an intimidating
group of associates tells B that B has been collecting rubbish in terri-
tory which the association regards as exclusively allocated to one of
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collector alleged that a rubbish collectors' organization protected its
territory by threatening to beat him up and destroy his equipment. 88
In explaining the decision, Justice Traynor recognized a "right to be
free from serious, intentional, and unprivileged invasions of mental
and emotional tranquility."'189 First, he wrote, "it is anomalous to
deny recovery because defendant's intentional misconduct fell short
of producing some physical injury" when mental suffering frequently
constitutes the major element of damages for some torts. 90 Next, in
response to arguments that physical injury is necessary to avoid
frivolous claims, Justice Traynor replied, "[t]he jury is ordinarily in a
better position.., to determine whether outrageous conduct results
in mental distress than whether that distress in turn results in physical
injury."'191 From their own experience, jurors can judge "the extent
and character of the disagreeable emotions that may result from the
defendant's conduct . . . . Greater proof that mental suffering oc-
curred is found in the defendant's conduct designed to bring it about
than in physical injury that may or may not have resulted there-
front"1
9 2
The same policy was expressed by Justice Schauer in Spellens v.
Spellens,193 an opinion that led to the abolition several years later of
interspousal immunity.194 In discussing a wife's action for abuse of
its members. A demands that B pay over the proceeds of his rubbish
collection, and tells B that if he does not do so the association will
beat him up, destroy his truck, and put him out of business. B is badly
frightened, and suffers severe emotional distress. A is subject to li-
ability to B for his emotional distress, and if it results in illness, A is
also subject to liability to B for his illness.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d, illus. 2 (1965).
188. See Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d at 335, 240 P.2d at 284.
189. Id. at 337-38, 240 P.2d at 287. Justice Traynor followed the 1948 ver-
sion of the Restatement, which adopted a privilege approach to the tort. See
supra Part I.
190. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2dat 338, 240 P.2dat 286.
191. Id.
192. Id. at338, 240 P.2dat286.
193. 49 Cal. 2d210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957).
194. See id. The abuse of process action in Spellens arose from a separate
action by a husband to recover possession of personal property. The plaintiff
claimed "that defendant maliciously commenced the action ... and caused a
claim and delivery writ to issue and be served." Id. at 230, 317 P.2d at 625.
The court said that the defendant's action was done for the "ulterior purpose of
making things difficult for plaintiff so she would drop her main action." Id.
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process, Justice Schauer said that it appeared to be an action for
mental suffering and pointed out that California then allowed one
spouse to sue the other for injury to property but not for injury to
person.195 He suggested that the court "could well consider overrul-
ing" the doctrine that barred such lawsuits because "[n]one of the
reasons which have been suggested in support of the common law
view apply to this action"; in particular, any conjugal harmony had
long since been disrupted and there could be no thought of collusion
between such warring parties. 19 6 Moreover, "[tihe court should not
decline to entertain a meritorious action against a spouse.., because
of the dubious apprehension that in some future case trifling domes-
tic difficulties may become the subject of litigation."'
197
Subsequently, the California Supreme Court abolished inter-
spousal immunity for intentional torts in Self v. Self,' 98 where the
wife in a pending divorce action had sued for assault and battery. 199
Interspousal immunity was out of line with the general policy of
California tort law, in which "the general rule is and should be that,
in the absence of statute or some compelling reason of public policy,
where there is negligence proximately causing an injury, there should
be liability. Immunity exists only by statute or by reason of compel-
ling dictates of public policy. Neither exists here.
20 1
195. See id. at 240, 317 P.2d at 631-32 (Schauer, J. dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
196. Id. at 241, 317 P.2dat 632.
197. Id.
198. 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962).
199. See id. Beginning in 1955, the California Supreme Court began elimi-
nating familial immunities. In that year, the court held a child may sue a par-
ent for an intentional tort See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 430, 289 P.2d
218, 224 (1955) ("Exceptions to the general principle of liability... are not to
be lightly created, and we decline to create such an exception on the basis of
the speculative assumption that to do so would preserve family harmony.").
The following year, the court held that interspousal immunity did not apply to
property torts like fraud. See Langley v. Schumacker, 46 Cal. 2d 601, 297
P.2d 977 (1956).
In 1962, the court held in companion cases that there was no interspousal
immunity for intentional torts, Self v. Self, or for negligence, Klein v. Klein, 58
Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962). Finally, in 1971, the court
abolished parental immunity for negligence suits by children. See Gibson v.
Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
200. Self, 58 Cal. at 689, 376 P.2d at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
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The court rejected various policy reasons advanced for immu-
nity, finding that tort actions endanger and harm conjugal harmony
no more than already-permitted property actions, and that the possi-
bility of perjury, fraud, and collusion is not relevant in an intentional
tort case.20 ' This decision not only established the general rule that
spouses ordinarily should be allowed to sue spouses, it also set the
stage for arguments that in a particular case, "compelling dictates of
public policy" might still preclude such actions.2 °2
Thus, by the 1960s, California's predominant tort law policy
imposed liability for wrongful acts between spouses. In the family
law realm, however, the trend moved toward fewer remedies for
conduct that disrupted marital relationships. Determining "that cer-
tain sexual conduct and interpersonal decisions are, on public policy
grounds, outside the realm of tort liability, '20 3 California enacted
statutes abolishing the traditional heart balm causes of action from
the 193 Os. 204 Critics of the heart balm actions focused on their po-
tential for blackmail or extortion, while some courts interpreted the
201. See id. at 689-91, 376 P.2d at 69-70, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 101-02. Also, the
court pointed to a legislative change providing that all damages awarded to a
married person in a civil action for personal injuries are the separate property
of the married person. See id. at 691, 376 P.2d at 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 101. Be-
fore this change, the court noted that if a wife sued her husband for a personal
tort, the recovery would be community property "controlled and managed by
the husband." Id. at 691, 376 P.2d at 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
202. Id. at 689, 376 P.2d at 69, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
203. Perry v. Atkinson, 195 Cal. App. 3d 14, 19, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Ct.
App. 1987) (barring a cause of action based on fraudulent misrepresentation
that defendant would impregnate the plaintiff later if she had an abortion now).
204. See Survey, The Work of the 1939 Legislature, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37
(1939) (providing more explanation of the reasons given to abolish the causes
of action: they were used for blackmail, they protected duties and obligations
unsuited to litigation, and they permitted disproportionate damages). The Cali-
fornia statutes are now codified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 43.4, 43.5 (West 1999).
Section 43.5 abolished the actions for alienation of affections, criminal conver-
sation, seduction of a person over the age of legal consent, and breach of a
promise to many. Section 43.4, enacted to end a loophole, abolished the ac-
tion for a fraudulent promise to marry or to cohabit after marriage. The legis-
lature did not abolish some causes of action set forth in section 49 of the Cali-
fornia Civil Code; that section still forbids "abduction or enticement of a child"
and seduction of a person under the age of consent CAL. CIV. CODE § 49
(West 1999).
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statutory abolition more broadly. The anti-heart balm statutes "em-
body a basic reluctance on the part of both the Legislature and the
judiciary to allow recovery for promises of love. This reluctance
stems, no doubt, from the sheer unseemliness of litigating tender
matters of romantic or sexual emotion in courts of law.
205
The trend against litigating "tender matters" continued with
California's 1969 enactment of the nation's first no-fault divorce
statute.20 Reacting to criticism that "fault" grounds for divorce were
symptoms rather than causes of a marriage's problems and that the
prevalence of uncontested divorces made the fault grounds a pre-
tense,20 7 California's new no-fault statute authorized divorce on only
two grounds, incurable insanity and "irreconcilable differences,
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage. 20 8
Today, California is one of twenty states classified as being pure no-
fault states, excluding consideration of marital misconduct in prop-
erty allocations and spousal maintenance adjudications.
20 9
B. Early lIED Claims Based on Interference with Parent-Child
Relationships
Many of California's domestic IED cases are based on allega-
tions of lies that have interfered with the establishment or continua-
tion of a parent-child relationship rather than on any interference
with the marital relationship. California courts uniformly reject such
causes of action, a result that is echoed in their rejection of sexual
205. Askew v. Askew, 22 Cal. App. 4th 942, 957-58, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284,
293 (Ct. App. 1994). "The idea that a judge, or jury of 12 solid citizens, can
arbitrate whether an individual's romantic declarations at a certain time are
true or false, or made with intent to deceive, seems almost ridiculously
wooden, particularly where the statements were made prior to marriage and the
marriage lasted more than 13 years." Id. at 959, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294. In
Askew, the plaintiff husband sued for fraud, claiming his bride-to-be falsely
told him before the marriage that she felt sexual attraction for him and he re-
lied on that statement to marry her and to put certain parcels of real property
into their names as joint tenants. See id. at 946, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285. The
court decided this claim was simply an abolished action for breach of promise.
See id. at 947, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286.
206. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 1999).
207. See CLARK, supra note 11, at 700 & n.46.
208. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 1999).
209. See Ellman, supra note 19, at 778, 781.
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partner TEED claims based on unwanted pregnancy but acceptance of
such claims when they are based on physical injury. Thus, an lIED
cause of action growing out of domestic conduct apparently can pro-
ceed only when it claims physical injury or the existence of a statu-
tory remedy."'
Based on familiar themes, California courts have rejected law-
suits based on closely related harms variously characterized as
wrongful creation of a relationship with a child, unwanted preg-
nancy, and misrepresentation of paternity. The results depend almost
entirely on the harms claimed. The best interests of the child and the
impossibility of righting the wrong with a legal remedy were the rea-
sons given for refusing to recognize a cause of action based on
wrongful creation of a relationship with a child in Richard P. v. Su-
perior Court.21 ' There, the court of appeal held that even though a
husband's complaint against a third party stated causes of action for
fraud and lED, "the subject matter of the action . . . is not one in
which it is appropriate for the courts to intervene. ' 212 Apparently
because of a stipulated judgment in which a husband waived his
rights to sue his former wife, Richard P. was not a cause of action
213between spouses. Instead, the husband filed a lawsuit alleging
fraud and RlED against the man who had an affair with his wife and
had fathered two children the husband thought were his. The hus-
band learned of the true paternity of the children two and one-half
years after the birth of the oldest.
214
Like "betrayal, brutal words, and heartless disregard of the
feelings of others," the court said that some wrongs are "beyond any
effective legal remedy and any practical administration of law" and
that attempting to remedy them may cause more social damage be-
cause 'the innocent children ... may suffer significant harm." 2 15 In
fact, wrote the court, "[fjor a man married to the mother of children
210. The existence of a statutory remedy supported IIED claims in Begier v.
Strom, 46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (Ct App. 1996) (regarding
false allegations of child abuse), and Surina v. Lucey, 168 Cal. App. 3d 539,
214 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct App. 1985) (involving child abduction).
211. 202 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1094,249 Cal. Rptr. 246, 249 (Ct App. 1988).
212. Id. at 1093, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
213. See id. at 1091, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 1094, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
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at the time of their conception to be allowed to bring a tort action
such as this against the true father of the children could. . . 'seldom,
if ever, result in benefit to a child"' and would even frustrate the
public policy of encouraging natural fathers to acknowledge and
support their own children because they would have a strong disin-
centive to reveal the truth.216 The court did not, however, foreclose
the possibility that the former husband might be able to recover the
actual costs incurred in supporting another man's children on a the-
ory such as unjust enrichment.217 The court ordered the lower court
to grant the former husband leave to amend to plead such a claim.
218
The rationale that legal compensation is sometimes impossible
or inappropriate barred the spousal lED claim in Nagy v. Nagy,219
where a California court of appeal held that "developing a close re-
lationship with a child misrepresented to be [your own] and per-
forming parental acts is not a 'damage' which should be compensa-
ble under the law."' 220 During the deposition of another witness in
their dissolution proceeding, Mrs. Nagy told her husband for the first
time that he was not the father of her son born three and one-half
years earlier.22' The subsequent dissolution judgment awarded sole
custody to the mother and permanently restrained Mr. Nagy from
contacting or communicating with the child.222 After the dissolution,
Mr. Nagy sued his former wife for RED and fraud.223 The fraud
cause of action failed because the former husband had not and could
not plead any legally recognizable damages other than emotional
distress, and such damages alone were not sufficient.224 Moreover,
allowing the fraud claim would be contrary to public policy because
216. Id. at 1095, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
217. See id. at 1096 n.3, 249 Cal. Rptr. 250 n.3.
218. See id. at 1096, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
219. 210 Cal. App. 3d 1262, 258 Cal. Rptr. 787 (Ct. App. 1989).
220. Id. at 1269-70, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
221. See id. at 1266, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
222. See id. at 1267, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
223. See id. at 1265, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
224. See id. at 1268-69, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The husband had waived his
right to sue for reimbursement of any money paid on behalf of the child. See
id. at 1267, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 789. In addition, the majority claimed that emo-
tional distress damages are recoverable in a fraud cause of action only as an
aggravation of other damages, which Mr. Nagy had not pleaded. See id. at
1269, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
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Mrs. Nagy's actions were similar to "a 'betrayal' for which the law
wisely should not provide a remedy.,
225
Having used public policy to preclude the fraud claim, the court
used California's statutory privilege for communications made in ju-
dicial proceedings to bar the HED claim 226 The court held that the
privilege applied to the former wife's statement that the child was
not Mr. Nagy's son because it was made during a deposition.227 In
the majority's opinion, the cause of action did not accrue until the
former husband suffered appreciable and actual harm and that harm
occurred in a privileged litigation setting.228 If Mr. Nagy thought
that he could avoid the statutory privilege by redrafting his complaint
to separate his emotional distress from the disclosure of the misrep-
resentation in a privileged setting, the court wrote that "we would
still be compelled to hold that public policy precludes such future re-
covery.3229 One justice concurred only in the judgment, saying that
"public policy concerns about lawsuits over extramarital relations,
paternity and other intrafamily conduct outweigh by a slight margin"
Mr. Nagy's right to compensation.2
A new public policy rationale emerged in lawsuits between sex-
ual partners claiming injuries resulting from sexual deceit. Balanc-
ing the constitutional right of privacy against public policy concerns
for the well-being and support of children, California courts reject
causes of action for unwanted pregnancy because children's interests
are at stake, but allow similar causes of action that cause physical
harm to a sexual partner because no children are involved.23'
225. Id. at 1270, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
226. See id. at 1270-71, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 1271, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
229. Id.
230. Id. (Johnson, J., concurring). As for the IIED claim, Justice Johnson
said the majority had failed to distinguish between conduct occurring during a
judicial proceeding and conduct occurring outside a judicial processing which
is revealed during a judicial proceeding. Again, however, Justice Johnson
concluded that "public policy considerations outweigh by a slight margin the
values that would be promoted by allowing a cause of action for intentional in-
fliction of emotional injury in the instant case." Id. at 1276, 258 Cal. Rptr. at
795.
231. See generally Murray & Winslett, supra note 58, at 780 & nn.5 & 6; see
also Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Sexual Partner's Tort Liability to Other
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The constitutional right to privacy is believed to preclude judi-
cial intervention when intentional lies lead to an unwanted preg-
nancy. Thus, in Stephen K. v. Roni L.,232 the court said that the com-
plaint "is nothing more than asking the court to supervise the
promises made between two consenting adults as to the circum-
stances of their private sexual conduct. To do so would encourage
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters affecting the indi-
vidual's right to privacy., 233 In this paternity action, the father ad-
mitted paternity but cross-complained for fraud because the mother
had falsely represented that she was taking birth control pills. 234 The
appellate court held that the facts pleaded were not actionable be-
cause "the circumstances and the highly intimate nature of the rela-
tionship wherein the false representations may have occurred, are
such that a court should not define any standard of conduct there-
for."5
235
The outcome is different when intentional lies lead to physical
harm to one of the sexual partners, rather than to an unwanted child.
The courts in the following cases distinguished Stephen K on the ba-
sis that they involved neither children nor public policy concerns
with respect to parental obligations. Thus, an appellate court held in
Barbara A. v. John G.236 that the complaint stated causes of action
for battery and deceit because it sought damages for severe bodily
injury.237 In Barbara A., a woman who became sterile after an ec-
topic pregnancy sued the man who had impregnated her, alleging
that he had falsely represented that he was sterile.23 8 The appellate
court distinguished Stephen K. because the father there was seeking
damages for wrongful birth, resulting in support obligations and
emotional distress, while the plaintiff in Barbara A. was seeking
Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or Use of Birth
Control Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 5TH 301 (1992) (noting that public
policy usually prevents liability for misrepresentations leading to the birth of a
normal child but allows recovery for misrepresentations resulting in actual
physical injuries).
232. 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1980).
233. Id. at 644-45, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
234. See id. at 641-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
235. Id. at 63, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
236. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
237. See id. at 375-76, 378-79, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 426-27, 429.
238. See id. at 373, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
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damages for injury to her body. 39 The Barbara A. court held that
"[a]lthough the constitutional right to privacy normally shields sex-
ual relations from judicial scrutiny, it does not do so where the right
to privacy is used as a shield from liability at the expense of the other
party.,,240 Similarly, physical injury to the plaintiff overcame the
constitutional right to privacy of the defendant in Kathleen K v.
Robert B.,24' where a woman sought damages for negligence, bat-
tery, HED, and fraud because the defendant had misrepresented that
he was free from venereal disease and she contracted genital herpes
from sexual intercourse with him?242 Although the constitutional
right of privacy in matters relating to marriage, family, and sex pre-
cludes unwarranted governmental intrusion, the court held that it was
outweighed in Kathleen K by the state's interest in protecting the
health, welfare, and safety of its citizens.2 43
These differing conclusions are reconcilable on the basis that
even if you commit a wrongful act, you are not liable when there is
no resulting harm. If an unwanted pregnancy is not recognized as
harm, then the result in Stephen K is correct. In both Barbara A. and
Kathleen K, the wrongful act caused the kind of harm that courts
almost always recognize-physical injury.
Finally, in Steve H. v. Wendy S.,244 a California Court of Appeal
again faced an IlED claim grounded on a misrepresentation of pater-
nity.245 The result was the same as in Nagy despite two major differ-
ences between the cases: rather than fraud, the cause of action was
239. See id. at 378-79, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 429. The dissenting judge rejected
any distinction and wrote that the claim in Barbara A., like the claim in Ste-
phen K, should be rejected because both were based on seduction, one of the
abolished heart balm causes of action. See id. at 385, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 434
(Scott, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 385, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
241. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
242. See id. at 993-95, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274-75.
243. See id. at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
244. 57 Cal. App. 4th 379, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90 (Ct. App. 1997), review
granted, 946 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1997), review dismissed, 960 P.2d 510 (Cal.
1998).
245. See id. at 379, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90. This case has no precedential
value in the California courts even though the California Supreme Court's
grant of review was later dismissed because it became unpublished as soon as
review was granted.
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lIED; and rather than fraudulent creation of a parent-child relation-
ship, the harm claimed was the attempted destruction of a parent-
child relationship. The majority cited the common themes of the
inadequacy of legal remedies and the possibility of harm to the child.
The majority added two public policy grounds for precluding the
claim: first, the claims resemble alienation of affection actions; and
second, the claims threaten judicial economy if spouses are allowed
to sue for what goes on in dissolution proceedings.2 46 As a result, the
court held that public policy precluded Steve's RED claim for emo-
tional distress caused by Wendy's effort to terminate his relationship
with the nearly three-year-old daughter he thought was his own.247
In dissent, Justice Vogel wrote that the majority had ignored Califor-
nia's abolition of spousal immunity, its recognition of HED, and the
parties' concession that the elements of HED had been well
pleaded.248 Instead, Justice Vogel said "the majority relies on cases
from other states to reach a legally anachronistic result that does little
more than reveal their troglodytic wish for a society that no longer
exists.5
249
First, the majority adopted the rationale of the Richard P. and
Nagy courts that some wrongs are beyond any effective legal rem-
edy, in particular those that result in the creation of a close and lov-
ing relationship with a child.250 If the husband's damage resulted
from the creation of such a relationship, his damage should not be
compensable. 251 The dissent responded that the Richard P. and Nagy
rationale was inapplicable because the plaintiffs there sought dam-
ages for the wrongful creation of a parent-child relationship while
Steve's claim was based on the attempted wrongful destruction of
such a relationship.252
246. See id. at 95.
247. See id. at 97.
248. See id. at 98 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. See id. at 92-93.
251. See id. at 93.
252. See id. at 100. Justice Vogel distinguished Richard P. and Nagy on the
basis of the damages being sought, the same basis on which the court in Bar-
bara A., the case in which sexual deceit caused bodily injury, distinguished
Stephen K, the case in which sexual deceit caused an unwanted pregnancy.
See id. at 100-101 n.4.
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Second, the court adopted the Richard P. and Nagy argument
that the best interests of the child precluded the lawsuit because a
trial would entangle Stephanie in the middle of bitter litigation.253
The dissent responded that the majority's policy concern for Stepha-
nie's well-being was legally irrelevant to this claim between Steve
and Wendy, the same as it would be to a battery or attempted murder
claim between them.
254
Third, the court limited its holding to Wendy's attempt in a dis-
solution proceeding to terminate Steve's parental rights, noting that
Steve had also attempted to terminate Wendy's parental rights in his
petition for sole custody of Stephanie.25 5 Because divorce and cus-
tody disputes customarily involve emotionally charged issues and
countercharges, the court decided to bar emotional distress claims
based on statements made and evidence introduced during dissolu-
tion proceedings. 6
Finally, the court decided that the policies underlying Califor-
nia's abolition of heart balm claims, in particular the action for al-
ienation of affections, supported a bar against Steve's claim.
25 7
Those policies, the court said, include preventing possible harm to
the child, avoiding the potential for abuse, and acknowledging the
inadequacy of the law in regulating human relationships. 8 In addi-
tion, other states had rejected causes of action based on alienation of
affections of a child because of the potential for abuse when the child
is the object of a family dispute and may be used as a pawn in fights
over money matters. 259  Because Steve's claim was based on an
253. See id. at 93-94.
254. See id. at 101.
255. See id. at 94-95.
256. See id. The court did not have to create a public policy bar to claims
based on statements made during dissolution proceedings; it already exists in
the form of California's absolute statutory privilege for communications made
in the course of a judicial proceeding. Although the court neither referred to
nor applied this privilege, apparently because it was not raised, the privilege
addresses the court's concerns by immunizing parties, attorneys, and witnesses
against liability for statements made in connection with any judicial proceed-
ing, including a dissolution action. See infra Part V.B. 1.
257. See id. at 95-96.
258. See id. at 95.
259. See id. (relying on Bock v. Lindquist 278 N.W.2d 326, 327-28 (Minn.
1979)).
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attempt to destroy a parent-child relationship, it resembled a claim
for alienation of affections of a child, and the policy reasons given
for not recognizing such causes of action should apply.260 The dis-
senting judge responded that, since Steve was not suing for aliena-
tion of affections, both California's abolition of the cause of action
for alienation of affections of a spouse and other states' rejection of a
cause of action for alienation of affections of a child were irrele-
vant.
261
Despite its rejection of spousal IJED based on conduct occurring
during dissolution, the majority left an opening when it said that
public policy might not bar all civil liability for attempts to terminate
a child's relationship with the other parent, referring specifically to
acts such as child-stealing.262 In fact, California courts have periodi-
cally recognized causes of action seeking emotional distress damages
for spousal misconduct when there can be no public policy objection
because a statute provides a civil remedy for the conduct.263 Thus, a
cause of action seeking emotional distress damages apparently can
be based on the California statute protecting a parent's right to
the custody and control of a minor child. 4 In Begier v. Strom,265
260. See id. at 96.
261. See id. at 101 (Vogel, J., dissenting).
262. See id. at 97-98 n.5 (citing Surina v. Lucey, 168 Cal. App. 3d 539, 543,
214 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1985), and Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App.
2d 431, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Ct App. 1963)).
263. A similar result occurred in a New Jersey case in which the husband re-
corded his wife's telephone conversations with her female lover in violation of
a New Jersey statute. The husband argued an interspousal exemption to the
statute, but the court found that the husband's behavior violated the state's
electronic eavesdropping law and recognized the wife's cause of action based
on the statute. The wife was awarded compensatory damages for the emo-
tional distress she suffered as a result of the husband's egregious conduct as
well as punitive damages. See M.G. v. J.C., 603 A.2d 990, 995 (N.J. Super.
Ct Ch. Div. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. Whitaker, 713
A.2d 20, 33-34 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998).
264. See Surina, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 542-43, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 511-12 (rely-
ing on CAL. CIV. CODE § 49 (West 1999)). The Surina court found that sec-
tion 49 establishes tort liability for a parent who abducts or entices a child
away, thus deterring child-stealing by feuding parents. See id. at 543, 214 Cal.
Rptr. at 512. Characterizing their emotional distress claims as a claim for vio-
lation of section 49, the court allowed the parents' causes of action against a
third party for removing their minor daughter from her home. See id. at 544-
45, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 513. The court said that the damages recoverable should
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without any mention of possible public policy objections, the court
allowed a spousal RED claim based on false allegations of child
abuse because a statute specifically provided for liability.
2 66
include the emotional distress resulting from the loss of the child and the ex-
penses incurred in restoring the child as well as punitive damages if appropri-
ate. See id. at 544, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 513.
The Surina court said that a tort action based on section 49 could be
brought even against a parent who has a right to custody of the child, contrast-
ing the tort with the crime of child-stealing which can be brought only against
a parent who has been deprived of any right to custody by court order. See id.
at 543, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The tort action was first recognized in California
in Rosefield v. Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 2d 431, 433-34, 34 Cal. Rptr. 479,
481-82 (Ct. App. 1963), but both Surina and Rosefield were actions against
third parties, not between parents. See Surina, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 542, 214
Cal. Rptr. at 511; Rosefield, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 432, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
265. 46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (1996).
266. See id. at 881-85, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-63. InBegier, the wife filed a
petition for dissolution and, about six weeks later, filed a police report falsely
accusing her husband of molesting the couple's daughter. See id. at 881, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160. The husband sued his wife for malicious prosecution and
HED based on the false police report and the repetition of the allegation in the
couple's dissolution action. See id. The trial court granted the wife's demur-
rer, apparently on the basis that the accusations made within the dissolution
proceeding were immune under California's litigation privilege. See id. at
880-82, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-61 (relying on CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (b) (West
Supp. 1999), which confers an absolute privilege upon publications made in
judicial proceedings). Although the false accusations within the dissolution
proceeding were covered by this provision, the appellate court said that the
false police report was covered instead by a similar privilege for statements
made "in any other official proceeding authorized by law." Id. at 883, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 161-62 (quoting Passman v. Torkan, 34 Cal. App. 4th 607, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 291 (1995)). Nonetheless, the privilege was outweighed by a more
specific California statute providing that a person "is liable" for any damages
caused by a report of child abuse that the maker knows is false. Id. at 884, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162 (relying on CAL. PEN. CODE § 11172 (West 1999)). The
legislature had struck a balance between encouraging reports of child abuse
and protecting the reputation of those who might be falsely accused by with-
holding immunity from persons who knowingly make false reports. See id. at
885, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163. Applying the official proceedings privilege
"would essentially nullify the Legislature's determination that liability should
attach." Id. The Begier court allowed the RIED cause of action even though a
Family Code provision provides sanctions against a party who falsely accuses
another of child abuse in a domestic relations proceeding. See id. at 887-88, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165. That statute specifically provides that the sanctions shall
be "in addition" to other remedies. Id. at 880 & n.2, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160 &
n.2 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 3027(c) (West Supp. 1999)). As for the hus-
band's malicious prosecution cause of action, the court held that the tort did
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IV. INTERFERENCE WITH THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP AS A
BASIS FOR SPOUSALIIED: THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS RECOGNITION
Relatively new torts based on loss of consortium, interference
with custodial rights, and interference with contractual relations rec-
ognize legally protectable interests in established relationships and in
the expectation that they will continue.267  Because they recognize
the right to recover damages for intentional interference with such
relationships, these torts provide a basis for recognizing spousal HED
claims based on intentional and unjustified interference with the es-
tablishment and continuation of parent-child relationships. This sec-
tion examines the most recent cases from states other than California,
most of which reach a conclusion opposite from California's uniform
denial of tort law recovery for spousal deceit that interferes with a
parent-child relationship.
A. Interference with Custodial Rights
Many courts recognize a cause of action for deprivation of cus-
tody, interference with custodial rights, or lED based on such depri-
vation or interference. 8 These causes of action may be sustained
not extend to family law proceedings. See id. at 886, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163
(relying on Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal. App. 4th 27, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251 (Ct.
App. 1993)).
267. See Levit, supra note 24, at 146-50.
268. The Restatement recognizes a cause of action by a parent who has the
right to the custody, control, and services of a minor child against anyone who
unlawfully takes or withholds such child. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 700 (1977). Recovery includes damages for the emotional distress
resulting from the loss of the child and for the expenses incurred in vindicating
the parent's rights. See id. cmt. g.
Even when they reject a separate cause of action for interference with
custody, some courts apparently would allow RED claims based on deprivation
of custody or interference with custody. See, e.g., Larson v. Dunn, 460
N.W.2d 39, 46 (Minn. 1990) (rejecting the tort of interference with custody as
being contrary to the best interests of the children, but willing to consider an
HED action based on the same conduct if the latter is egregious); Zaharias v.
Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 141 (Okla. 1992) (refusing to recognize the tort of in-
terference with custodial relations but stating that the same facts might entitle
the plaintiff to relief under IIED). For cases involving deprivation of custody,
see Kunz v. Deitch, 660 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1987), holding that seven
months deprivation of custody sufficient to state prima facie case for IIED, and
Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 433 (Vt 1978) (stating deprivation of custody
for one month states prima facie case for IIED). For cases based on interfer-
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against anyone who unlawfully takes or withholds such child, and
may be based not only on the loss of services but also on the parent's
right to the care, custody, and companionship of the child.269 The
cause of action has been extended from its most usual application-
the physical taking or withholding of a child-to an lIED cause of
action based on the "deliberate frustration of a close and affectionate
relationship between parent and child.,
2 70
Opponents of this tort, like opponents of spousal IED, argue
that recognizing it is contrary to the "best interests" of the children
involved. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to
recognize the tort in Larson v. Dunn271 on the ground that allowing
parents to battle endlessly over family matters would not serve
the best interests of the children.272 Unlike the lawsuits in most
ence with custodial rights, see Kajtazi v. Kajtazi, 488 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), stating that action of defendant in abducting infant from mother with
legal custody and falsely imprisoning him in YugoslaviA stated HIED claim,
and Pankratz v. Willis, 744 P.2d 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987), holding that uni-
lateral separation of child from parents can be extreme and outrageous con-
duct; orBartanus v. Lis, 480 A.2d 1178, 1182-83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984), hold-
ig that the allegation that family enticed plaintiff s son to stay away from
father states a claim for IIED. See also Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of
Emotional Distress Claims in Minnesota, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1, 67-68
(1993) (contrasting claims for IED with claims for interference with custodial
rights).
269. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 crnt. g (1977).
270. Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 340 (4th Cir. 1985). There, a father testi-
fied that he had been unable to find his former wife and his child for more than
four years and that his later efforts to reestablish a relationship with the child
were thwarted by the mother. See id. at 337. The Raftery court rejected argu-
ments that the abolition of alienation of affection claims eliminated the cause
of action. See id. at 33 8-40.
See also Bhama v. Bhama, 425 N.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Mich. Ct. App.
1988), where the trial court rejected as not outrageous a parent's attempt to
create a hostile relationship between the other parent and their child because
such conduct was "a problem in almost every marital case." However, the ap-
pellate court held that the plaintiff wife's allegations that her estranged hus-
band had brainwashed their children into rejecting her were sufficient to allow
the jury to consider recovery on remand. See id. at 737. The appellate court
said it was "unpersuaded that the deliberate destruction of a parent-child rela-
tionship can never be recognized as outrageous conduct." Id. at 736.
271. 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn. 1990).
272. See id. at 46. Other courts that applied the best interests of the child
standard also have rejected the tort. See Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 200
(Mo. Ct App. 1987); Zaharias v. Gammill, 844 P.2d 137, 140 (Okla. 1992).
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of the thirteen prior state supreme court decisions that decided that
the tort furthered public policy objectives, the Minnesota lawsuit was
filed after the kidnapped child had returned home.273
Rather than a more traditional tort analysis, the majority of the
Minnesota Supreme Court turned to the family law standard for
making custody determinations and found that it would not be in the
child's best interests to allow her father to pursue a cause of action
against her mother. Adopting the new tort would place the child in
the middle of a bitter family dispute, might allow relitigation of
original custody determinations, and "could be used as a weapon for
revenge and continued hostility., 274 The dissenting justices argued,
however, that a child's best interests are served "by encouraging the
return of absent children by imposing a civil damages remedy.
275
B. Misrepresentation of Paternity
Even though they are "just the sort of lies that commonly lead to
marital break-ups,, 276 misrepresentations of paternity can be viewed
as analogous to interference with custody because they distort or dis-
rupt the establishment and the continuation of the parent-child rela-
tionship. Unlike the analysis in Steve H.,277 three very recent opin-
ions recognized misrepresentations of paternity as outrageous
conduct sufficient to state an lIED claim. In particular, these courts
focus on the harm claimed which is the threatened destruction of a
parent-child relationship, rather than the breakup of a marriage or the
creation of a parent-child relationship. Thus, the claims are allowed
because they seek damages not for the support obligations in-
curred because of a spouse's fraudulent creation of a parent-child
273. Most of the other cases resulted from efforts to recover still-missing
children or to recover damages from third parties who helped carry out the
kidnapping. See Daniel Oberdorfer, Comment, Larson v. Dunn: Toward a
Reasoned Response to Parental Kidnapping, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1701, 1701-02
(1991).
274. Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 45-47.
275. Id. at 52 (Popovich, C.J., joined by Yetka & Kelley, JJ., dissenting).
276. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1328 (citing Koepke v. Koepke,
556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989), in which a husband sued his wife for
emotional distress caused by her disclosure that her child was not his, and
Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991), in which a wife
sued her husband for falsely telling her that he had tested positive for AIDS).
277. 57 Cal. App. 4th 379, 67 Cal. Rptr. 2d 90 (1997).
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relationship nor for the emotional distress associated with the disso-
lution of a marriage, but instead for the emotional losses suffered be-
cause of a spouse's attempted dissolution of a parent's ongoing rela-
tionship with a child.
Thus, in Doe v. Doe,278 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
rejected a series of public policy objections to a husband's claims of
fraud and ]IED based on his wife's misrepresentation that he was the
father of two of the parties' three children. 9 Shortly after discov-
ering that his wife had engaged in an affair for seven years and that
the children might not be his, the husband filed for divorce on
grounds of adultery. 280 After a paternity test confirmed that he was
not the biological father of the three-year-old twins, but was the fa-
ther of the older child, the husband added lIED and fraud causes of
action to his complaint for divorce.281 He sought damages for his
emotional distress upon learning that he was not the biological father
of the twins and for the financial investment incurred as a result of
the fraud.282 The trial court dismissed all the tort claims on the
grounds that they would harm the best interests of the children, im-
pede the efficient administration of justice, and provide little benefit
to the husband because the divorce action would provide a complete
remedy.
283
The appellate court rejected the trial court's reasoning: given
the abrogation of interspousal immunity and recognition of emo-
tional distress claims, it logically followed that a spouse could sue a
spouse for lIED, and the court found no public policy that prevented
recovery.284 First, "[i]n this case, as with most other domestic tort
cases, discord, suspicion, and distrust have already entered the Doe
home. The historic public policy rationale precluding interspousal
suits seems inane when there is no home to disrupt and no do-
mestic tranquility left to preserve., 285 Second, as for the trial court's
278. 712 A.2d 132 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1998), cert. granted, 717 A.2d 384
(Md. 1998).
279. See id. at 138-39.
280. See id. at 136-37.
281. See id. at 137.
282. See id. at 138.
283. See id. at 138-39.
284. See id. at 145-46.
285. Id. at 146.
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reliance on the best interests of the children, the appellate court said
that standard, though integral to child custody determinations, was
irrelevant in this interspousal suit.286 Because paternity had already
been determined, "the children are neither parties nor witnesses in
the counts of the complaint at issue here; therefore, the standard does
not apply., 287 In addition, the children would not be subject to any
more intrafamilial warfare in a tort action than in the companion di-
vorce action, and the wife should not be able to use her children as a
shield to avoid potential liability for her tortious conduct.288 Finally,
the appellate court found no possibility of double recovery because
tort actions and divorce proceedings are "intended to effect different
purposes, with different remedies.'
289
Having rejected public policy as a ground for refusing to recog-
nize the claim at all, the appellate court reversed the trial court's
finding that the husband had not stated the intent and conduct ele-
ments of a claim for IIED.29 ° The intent element was satisfied be-
cause the wife knew the truth and misled her husband and because
her continuing affair indicated that she knew "there was a high de-
gree of probability that Mr. Doe would discover the truth" about the
affair and the paternity.
291
The outrageous conduct element also was satisfied. Even
though misrepresentation of paternity may not be uncommon, it
passes the threshold and "a fact-finder therefore should be given the
opportunity to decide whether Ms. Doe's actions in concealing her
affair, concealing the children's paternity, and affirmatively misrep-
resenting Mr. Doe as the father of the twins in this particular case
was sufficiently outrageous to result in liability.2292 As for the fraud
286. See id. at 147.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 147-48.
289. Id. at 148.
290. See id. at 160.
291. Id. at 153 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. i
(1965)).
292. Id. at 154. In particular, the court cited the following: "Ms. Doe told a
falsehood going to the heart of the marital and parental relationship"; "the
falsehood was repeated every day"; "Ms. Doe caused Mr. Doe to develop a pa-
rental relationship with the twins, then caused him to learn that the children
were not biologically his own'; "Ms. Doe used Mr. Doe to fulfill the emo-
tional, physical, and financial obligations of a father for three years, knowing
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count, the appellate court again disagreed that the best interests of the
children constituted a public policy bar to an interspousal tort suit.
Instead, the husband had adequately stated a cause of action and was
seeking damages for the "losses he claims to have suffered because
of Ms. Doe's alleged fraud, not damages for developing a loving re-
lationship with the children.
293
In a lawsuit against a third-party lover, a 1999 New Jersey
opinion also concluded that misrepresentation of paternity can meet
the extreme and outrageous conduct element of lED and that legally
recognizable damages can be based on attempted destruction of a
parent-child relationship.294 Like Doe v. Doe, C.M. v. J.M. examined
the viability of an IED claim by a husband who had been led to be-
lieve that the children born during his marriage were his own when
they were instead the products of an ongoing affair.29' The husband
sought damages from his wife's lover for "emotional distress result-
ing from the severance of a financial and emotional bond with the
children he was led to believe were his own., 2 96 In a decision on a
motion to dismiss the complaint based on statutory abolition of heart
balm claims, the court determined that the husband should be al-
lowed to proceed because he was seeking to recover for emotional
distress resulting from the dissolution of his relationship with the
children, rather than from the dissolution of his relationship with his
wife.
297
First, the court found that none of the allegations fell within the
causes of action barred by the "Heart Balm" Act.298 Next, the court
relied on cases from other states to find that outrageous conduct is
sufficiently pleaded "when an affair leads to the birth of a child held
out to be another's., 299 Third, the court found that the intent element
those obligations were not really his"; "Ms. Doe failed to reveal the truth, even
when confronted"; and "Ms. Doe caused Mr. Doe to suffer from the knowl-
edge that he had been hoodwinked and used." Id. at 160.
293. Id. at 162.
294. See C.M. v. J.M., 726 A.2d 998, 1001-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1999).
295. See id. at 999.
296. Id. at 1000.
297. See id. at 1000-01.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 1002 (citing Koelle v. Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct.
1996); Doe v. Doe, 712 A.2d 132 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Miller v. Miller,
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was met because the affair started before the marriage and continued
during the marriage and after the birth of both children. 300 The wife
and her lover "behaved recklessly, in deliberate disregard of the high
degree of probability that their affair would be uncovered after each
birth, by maintaining their sexual relationship, and by concealing,
from J.M., the true paternity of the children.",301 As for the lover, the
court said he was obviously a cause of the children's births and that
he "abandoned any obligation to the children, while [the husband]
helped his wife feed, raise, fund, educate and nurture children that
were not his own."
302
In the most recent misrepresentation of paternity decision, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals agreed that no public policy prevented a
spouse from suing his current or former spouse for fraud, intentional
misrepresentation, or UIED.303 Whether a claim of misrepresentation
of paternity can support those causes of action "goes to whether the
elements of each tort are met, not whether the conduct occurred dur-
ing a marriage., 30 4 In G.A.W., III v. D.M. W., the husband learned
during dissolution that he was not the father of two children born
during the marriage. 30 5 After a dissolution settlement agreement, the
ex-husband sued his former wife for her misrepresentation of pater-
nity.30 6 The court first held that the claims were not barred by collat-
eral estoppel or res judicata because they were not required to be
raised in the dissolution proceeding. 07 In rejecting public policy ar-
guments against bringing the tort claims in another forum, the court
956 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1998)). In particular, the court said that the following ac-
tions were sufficient to support a claim of extreme and outrageous conduct:
Keeping the duration of the affair a secret from J.M., as well as sup-
pressing the true paternity of [the first child] for almost three years,
including four months after the paternity of [the second child] had
been disclosed, without regard to the high degree of probable harm to
defendant would indeed lead the average member of the community
to exclaim 'Outrageous!'
Id. at 1004.
300. See id. at 1004.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See G.A.W., I v. D.M.W., 596 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
304. Id. at 290.
305. See id. at 286.
306. See id.
307. See id. at 287-89.
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noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court had abolished interspousal
immunity and the legislature had abolished heart balm actions 0 8 "If
the legislature had intended to abolish other torts arising out of the
marital relationship, we conclude that it would have so provided.
30 9
These recent results were foreshadowed by the Ohio decision in
Koepke v. Koepke, 310 recognizing a similar claim ten years earlier. In
Koepke, a husband sued his wife for BED after she announced in her
divorce petition that he was not the father of her one-year-old son.31'
The judge assigned to the divorce action dismissed the complaint on
public policy grounds, stating the injury could and "should be con-
sidered in the divorce litigation."312 Although the court of appeals
agreed with the trial court that most divorce actions involve some
form of emotional distress, it recognized that "a domestic relations
forum is not the proper forum in which to litigate a tort claim" and
therefore held that a spouse could bring a tort claim for emotional
distress arising from a marital relationship separately from the di-
vorce action.313
Identical results have been reached in cases involving misrepre-
sentations of paternity before a marriage or outside a marriage. In
Koelle v. Zwiren,31 4 an Illinois appellate court held that Koelle, a
young man who had a brief sexual affair with Zwiren, had stated a
claim for BED based on a misrepresentation of paternity and that his
damages were cognizable because he did not seek to be paid for love
and affection. 315 Instead, he sought compensation for the losses he
suffered due to the fraud of the child's mother and for the pain and
anxiety he experienced due to the RED.316 In Miller v. Miller,317 the
308. See id. at289.
309. Id.
310. 556 N.E.2d 1198 (Ohio Ct App. 1989).
311. See id. at 1198-99.
312. Id. at 1199.
313. Id. at 1200.
314. 672 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
315. See id. at 875.
316. See id. Knowing that Koelle was not the father of her child, Zwiren de-
liberately misrepresented to Koelle for eight years that he was the child's fa-
ther, asked him to keep the baby's paternity a secret, and told him she would
not ask for any financial support. See id. at 870-71. After a paternity test
showed that he was not the child's father, Koelle sued for fraud, HIED, and also
sought visitation rights with the child. See id. at 871. The trial court dismissed
January 2000] LIES BETWEEN MOMMVYAND DADDY
Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed an RED cause of action based on
premarital and marital lies that caused the plaintiff to develop a pa-
rental relationship with a child and then caused him to learn the child
was not his own.
3 18
plaintiff's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted because "'love and affection' are 'noncompensable."' Id. at
871-72. The appellate court disagreed, rejecting the mother's best interest of
the child argument because any harm the child may have suffered would have
been caused by the mother: "If anything, plaintiff s lawsuit seeks to limit the
harm caused [and to allow] plaintiff and [the child] to continue their loving
father-daughter relationship." Id. at 875. The court concluded that public
policy does not protect people who engage in behavior such as Zwiren's and
"we will not allow defendant to use her daughter to avoid responsibility for the
consequences of her alleged deception." Id.
317. 956 P.2d887 (Okla. 1998).
318. See id. In Miller, the husband sued his former wife and her parents, al-
leging that they knowingly misrepresented that she was pregnant with his child
to induce him to marry her. See id. at 891. After their divorce, the court or-
dered the former husband to pay child support and when the daughter was 15,
she moved into his house. See id. at 892. A year later, the daughter told Mr.
Miller that her mother and grandparents had told her that he was not her bio-
logical father. See id. A paternity test verified that he was not. See id. Mr.
Miller filed suit for fraud and IIED; the trial court dismissed the suit, and the
intermediate appellate court affirmed on the basis that the conduct alleged
failed to reach the standard of outrageousness. See id. at 892-93. The Okla-
homa Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the following allegations were
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to meet the Restatement standard:
[T]elling a premarital falsehood going to the heart of the marital and
parental relationship, a falsehood that was implicitly repeated every
day... causing the plaintiff to develop a parental relationship with a
child... and then causing plaintiff to learn that the child was not bio-
logically his own ... using the plaintiff to fulfill the ... obligations of
a husband for almost five years and of a father for fifteen years...
undermining the plaintiff s relationship to his child... failing to re-
veal the truth to the plaintiff in the divorce action ... causing the
plaintiff to suffer from the knowledge that he had been hoodwinked
and used....
Id. at 902.
The supreme court decided, however, that the husband did not state a
claim for unjust enrichment in his request for restitution of payments he had
made under the child support order for ten years. See id. at 905.
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V. ThE CASE FOR ALLOWING SPOusAL lED CLAfmS BASED ON
INTENTIONAL AND UNJUSTIFIED INTERFERENCE WITH A PARENT-
CHILD RELATIONSHIP
Spousal emotional distress claims raise a traditional question:
Should some wrongs be left uncompensated by the legal system and
resolved, if at all, within the family? Most states have answered this
question by eliminating legal compensation for misrepresentations
that interfere with or threaten to destroy the marital relationship, ei-
ther through adoption of no-fault divorce, abolition of heart balm
claims, or both.3 19 For deceitful spousal conduct aimed at the marital
relationship, state legislatures may well have made a policy decision
that most such conduct should not be remedied by money damages.
The conduct examined in this Article aims in a different direc-
tion, interfering with or threatening to destroy a parent-child relation-
ship rather than a marriage. The Article concludes that state legisla-
tures have made no decision to preclude money damages for lies and
betrayals that interfere with or threaten to destroy the parent-child
relationship, and the courts should not do so either.
A. Legislative Intent
1. Did the legislature intend to preclude all spousal fED claims
based on marital misconduct when it enacted no-fault divorce?
Some commentators would reject spousal tort actions in no-fault
states because tort actions necessarily introduce fault. 320 However,
a spousal battery action can be pursued despite the adoption of
319. Cf Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1770, 1771 n.5 (1985) (citing statutes abolishing actions for promise to marry
and which often abolished the related common law actions for alienation of af-
fections, criminal conversation, and seduction).
320. One critic wrote that "an extreme return to marital fault through an un-
expected side door threatens to create havoc with no-fault divorce. Tort law
has become the vehicle, alongside or after a divorce action, to compensate one
spouse financially for torts inflicted during the marriage by the other spouse."
Krause, supra note 24, at 1363. Professor Krause predicted that allowing such
claims "will reintroduce to the end of marriage more and worse acrimony than
no-fault divorce ever eliminated." Id. at 1364. He proposed instead a re-
thinking of the wholesale rejection of fault from the financial consequences of
divorce to maintain family law jurisdiction over marital misconduct. See id. at
1366-67.
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no-fault.32' The state's decision that battery is a crime effectively
counters the argument that the legislature intended to eliminate bat-
tery as a spousal cause of action when it eliminated fault considera-
tions from dissolution proceedings.
The question for other spousal tort actions is the same: by
adopting no-fault, has the state legislature expressly or impliedly de-
cided to eliminate tort claims based on a particular kind of marital
misconduct. The state legislature probably intended for the state's
divorce code to provide the exclusive remedy for some wrongs or to
exclude any remedy for other wrongs. For example, if the wrong is
the basis for a request for dissolution, spousal support, property dis-
tribution, child support, or child custody, the state legislature may
well have intended its divorce and family code to provide exclusive
coverage for such a wrong.322 Even though the spouse in a no-fault
state will recover nothing in a dissolution proceeding for emotional
losses or pain and suffering associated with the reasons for the dis-
solution request, that may be precisely what the legislature intended.
Because the adoption of no-fault merely rules out fault as a
grounds for divorce rather than ruling out all considerations of
wrongdoing between spouses, it is certain that at least some tort
claims may still be brought. No-fault divorce is irrelevant to tort
claims based on conduct unrelated to the dissolution of a marriage.
Because divorce actions and tort actions serve different functions and
have different purposes, even conduct related to the dissolution of a
321. See, e.g., Smart v. Stuart; 421 N.W.2d 505, 507 (Wis. 1988) (holding
that the wife's proceeding with a divorce action did not constitute a relin-
quishment of a right to bring a tort action against the husband because the evi-
dentiary requirements of a divorce action are distinct from a battery claim).
322. Such a division between family court proceedings and domestic tort
claims is analogous to the bright line established by the U.S. Supreme Court to
distinguish between "domestic relations" claims and claims that can be brought
in federal court despite the domestic relations exception to federal diversity ju-
risdiction. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 706 (1992). Federal
courts simply do not have jurisdiction to grant divorces, award alimony, or to
determine the custody of a child even though the requirements of diversity ju-
risdiction are otherwise satisfied. See id. at 703-04; see also CLARK, supra
note 11, at 705-07; Michael Ashley Stein, The Domestic Relations Exception to
Federal Jurisdiction: Rethinking an Unsettled Federal Courts Doctrine, 36
B.C. L. REv. 669, 682-88 (1995) (examining the development of the domestic
relations exception).
510 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREUYEW [Vol. 33:449
marriage should be assessed as a possible basis for a tort action. The
function of a divorce action is to terminate a relationship and allocate
resources, usually without regard to fault, while a tort action com-
pensates one spouse for the wrong of the other. Even though crimi-
nal law may punish the wrongdoer and "[d]ivorce or separation
[may] provide escape from tortious abuse [they] can hardly be
equated with a civil right to redress and compensation for personal
injuries ' 323 and such double coverage has been widely accepted in
cases involving domestic violence.32 4
As for the spousal IlED claims discussed in this Article, no-fault
is in one sense irrelevant because the statutes providing for no-fault
dissolution of marriage do not encompass the establishment and
continuation of parent-child relationships. Still, one may argue that
dissolution of a parent-child relationship lies solely within the prov-
ince of a state's family code. Although the parent-child relationship
is based first on biology, rather than on law, a legal relationship
comes about once natural or presumed parenthood is established.325
Unlike the marital relationship, however, the parent-child relation-
ship is only rarely subject to modification or termination.32 6 And
unlike the purpose of a state divorce code, which is to govern the dis-
solution of the spousal relationship and the division of family assets,
the purpose of the child custody and support provisions is to preserve
parent-child relationships and to enforce parental rights and obliga-
tions.
327
323. Merenoffv. Merenof 388 A.2d 951, 962 (N.J. 1978).
324. See, e.g., id. (reaching conviction that personal injuries tortiously in-
ficted by one spouse on another entitles wronged spouse to compensation).
325. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3010 (West 1994) (presuming father is entitled
to custody); id. § 7611 (establishing presumption of paternity).
326. See WESTFALL, supra note 10, at 311.
327. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 1999) ("[I]t
is the public policy of this state to assure that children have frequent and con-
tinuing contact with both parents... and to encourage parents to share the
rights and responsibilities of child rearing .... "); §§ 3900, 3901 (father and
mother have an equal responsibility to support children up to age 18); id. §
4053(a) (parent's first and principal obligation is to support children). The
contempt of court process can perhaps address "those cases in which a party
intentionally violates family-law-based legal obligations either during the di-
vorce process or after," including such things as concealing assets, violating a
support order, and concealing children. Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at
1278 n.37. No such family law remedy is available for claims of interference
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Even without a no-fault equivalent to dissolution of a parent-
child relationship, the dissolution of marriage often brings about the
disruption of parent-child relationships. State family codes provide a
strong argument against recognizing spousal BED based on such
disruption. Although some judges have argued that the policy of
safeguarding the best interests of the children is irrelevant unless
child custody matters are involved, the policy is obviously implicated
in a spousal TED claim based on interference with a parent-child re-
lationship. In fact, some critics contend that the recent changes in
family law have had the unfortunate result of placing children at the
center of parental battles: instead of fighting over the grounds for
divorce or the amount of support, many parents turned their disputes
into custody battles.3 28 For spousal HED claims based on interfer-
ence with parent-child relationships, a real conflict exists between
parents' legally protectable interests in their relationships with their
children and the possibility that allowing a tort claim may provide
another vehicle for exacerbating the psychological and financial
damages of divorce.
Finally, though, it is difficult to discern how allowing one parent
to escape liability for interfering with the child's existing relationship
with the other parent can support the best interests of the children.
The best interests policy does, however, mean that judges should
protect against the possibility that a child's future support may be
diminished by allowing a spouse to recover excessive damages from
the other spouse.
329
2. Did the legislature intend to preclude all spousal HlED claims
based on domestic deceit when it abolished heart balm claims?
Spousal claims of deceitful interference with parent-child rela-
tionships have some things in common with the abolished heart
balm causes of action. Like breach of promise and alienation of
with parent-child relationships that are not yet the subject of court orders.
328. See generally KARP & KARP, supra note 36, at 389 (discussing the in-
crease in custody litigation since the 1970s).
329. In addition, tort litigation between parents can harm children because it
causes financial hardship to one or both parents. See Wood v. Wood, 338
N.W.2d 123, 129 (Iowa 1983) (Wolle, J., dissenting) (asserting that the "par-
ents' continuing internecine struggle" will exhaust money needed for raising
children).
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affections, parent-child interference claims are based on lies and mis-
representations that create and destroy family relationships. In this
view, lies about paternity are just one of the kinds of lies that spouses
tell each other, and actions based upon such lies should be barred for
the same reason that heart balm claims have been abolished: there is
"a public policy against litigation of the affairs of the heart. '330
The abolition of heart balm claims has had one direct effect on
spousal IUED: adultery cannot be the basis for a claim of outrageous
conduct. Beyond that, most courts hold that spousal IED causes of
action survived the abolition of heart balm claims, although there
exists some dispute concerning whether the policies behind the
statutory abolition should bar some spousal IED claims.331 Some
courts have extended abolition of heart balm claims to spousal IED
on the grounds that when the law provides no remedy for adultery or
alienation of affections, it should also provide no remedy for adultery
or alienation of affections by another name or for the byproduct of
330. Askew v. Askew, 22 Cal. App. 4th 942, 947, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 284, 286
(Ct. App. 1994) (barring a husband's fraud claim based on his wife's premari-
tal statements of sexual attraction and his transfer of property to her in reliance
on those statements). A similar claim has been made that the adoption of no-
fault divorce was a legislative signal that courts should avoid public inquiry
into what went wrong in a marriage: "Not only should intramarital activity or-
dinarily not be the basis for tort liability, it should also be protected against
disclosure in tort litigation." Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1325 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1991).
331. See, e.g., Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 339 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985) (find-
ing that RED is not the same as a claim for alienation of affections of a child).
Rejecting the mother's argument that the father's IIED claim was simply an
action for alienation of affections, which had been abrogated by statute, the
court in Raftery said the two causes of action are separate and distinct kinds of
wrongdoing with different elements and burdens of proof. See id. Even if the
son's affections had not been alienated, the "unwarranted breach in the physi-
cal relationship and its resulting adverse impact on the father would have enti-
tled [the father] to some damages" under IED. Id. at 339; see also Van Meter
v. Van Meter, 328 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Iowa 1983) (holding HIED is not affected
by statutory abolition because it differs from alienation of affections in its ele-
ments and policy considerations); Bartanus v. Lis, 480 A.2d 1178, 1182-85
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding IED claim allowed even though court refused
to recognize cause of action for alienation of affections).
Other courts find that the statutory abolition of alienation of affections
claims essentially abolished IED claims between spouses. See Weicker v.
Weicker, 237 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1968) (per curiam); Koestler v. Pollard, 471
N.W.2d 7 (Wis. 1991).
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adultery or alienation of affections. 2 Thus, several courts have held
that a plaintiff cannot evade the elimination of heart balm claims by
simply calling the cause of action lED instead of adultery.333
The broader argument--that the statutory abolition of heart
balm claims reaches farther than obvious attempts to plead the same
causes of action under different names-fails for several reasons.
First, none of the abolished causes of action could be brought be-
tween spouses. It is difficult to determine whether the legislature
intended to make any assertions or imply policies regarding suits
between spouses when it abolished suits that were not between
spouses. Second, the heart balm claims had different focuses and
alleged different harms than lED claims, seeking compensation for
disruption of the marital relationship rather than for injury to the per-
son. The tort action for alienation of affections claimed that the
332. As the court reasoned in one case, if the law did not provide a remedy
for a "fraudulent promise to fulfill the rights, duties and obligations of a mar-
riage relationship," logically it did not provide any remedy for a "fraudulent
promise by a married man to impregnate a woman not his wife." Perry v. At-
kinson, 195 Cal. App. 3d 14, 19, 240 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Ct App. 1987). In
Perry, a woman sued for fraud and deceit for pain caused by an abortion she
agreed to undergo in reliance on the defendant's promise that he would im-
pregnate her later. See id. at 16, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 403; see also Boyd v. Boyd,
228 Cal. App. 2d 374, 381, 39 Cal. Rptr. 400, 404 (Ct. App. 1964) (barring a
woman's lawsuit for breach of fraudulent promise to live with and support her
as being covered by abolished cause of action for breach of promise to cohabit
after marriage).
333. See, e.g., Koestler, 471 N.W. 2d at 9. In Koestler, a husband sued his
wife's lover for IIED for intentionally concealing that he was the biological
father of a child born during the marriage and only revealing his paternity four
years later, after the plaintiff had developed a bond with the child. See id. at 8.
Given the state legislature's abolition of criminal conversation causes of ac-
tion, the court held that a "complaint which alleges the facts necessary to state
a claim for criminal conversation does not state a claim for relief even if it al-
leges additional facts which need not be alleged to state a claim for criminal
conversation." Id. The court said the facts alleged in the plaintiffs complaint
were identical to the facts required for criminal conversation or flowed directly
from those facts. See id. at 9-10. In addition, the court barred the claim for the
public policy reason that it would embroil courts in a dispute in which their
intervention is inappropriate. See id. at 10-12; see also Askew, 22 Cal. App.
4th at 946, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285 (barring a husband's fraud claim based on
his wife's premarital statements of sexual attraction and his transfer of property
to her in reliance on those statements as nothing more than a breach of promise
cause of action).
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defendant had interfered with the marital emotional relationship;
damages resulted from the effect of the defendant's conduct on the
plaintiffs spouse. The tort action for criminal conversation claimed
that the defendant had interfered with the marital sexual relationship;
damages resulted from the defendant's sexual relationship with the
plaintiffs spouse. In contrast, spousal IED actions claim that the
defendant has interfered with the plaintiffs emotional well-being.
Damages to the plaintiff result from the effect of the defendant's
conduct directed towards the plaintiff11
4
The better arguments based on abolition of heart balm claims
are (1) that the problems underlying heart balm claims are identical
to those underlying spousal RED claims, and (2) that the policies ad-
vanced by statutory abolition of such claims would be furthered by
rejecting spousal IED claims as well. Spousal lIED claims like the
ones endorsed in this Article do not, however, pose the same prob-
lems as heart balm claims. Because they often were based on sexual
misconduct, heart balm claims could be abused for the purpose of
blackmail and extortion since their proof required intrusion into very
intimate aspects of a marriage. IIED claims do not carry the same
potential for abuse because-in contrast to criminal conversation and
alienation of affections in particular-it is far more difficult to prove
all the elements of IIED.335 Courts also objected to heart balm
claims because they were asked to regulate sexual conduct that could
not be regulated and to enforce romantic promises that could not be
enforced. To do so, courts had to inquire into private matters. Pa-
rental interference claims require no regulation of sexual conduct or
enforcement of promises of love. As for inquiring into private mat-
ters, no testimony will be required to determine paternity and little
private information will be revealed in determining whether a mis-
representation was made.
Finally, critics of spousal IIED contend that state legislatures
that have adopted no-fault divorce and abolished heart balm claims
334. See Bartanus v. Lis, 480 A.2d 1178, 1185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (con-
trasting a parent's IIED action with a parent's action for alienation of a child's
affection on the basis that the alleged harm is different; in IIED the focus is on
the effect the conduct has on the plaintiff, while in alienation of affections the
focus is on the effect the conduct has on the child); Koestler, 471 N.W.2d at
12-13 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
335. See Koestler, 471 N.W.2d at 14-15 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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have expressed a general public policy against tort claims based on
sexual misconduct and broken promises of love.336 Even if there is
such a public policy, it should have no impact on spousal actions
based on tortious conduct other than that described by the heart balm
causes of action and the prior fault grounds for divorce. 37  In
336. See Askew, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 959-60, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294-95.
Such lawsuits are "fundamentally incompatible with a statutory scheme of no-
fault divorce" because "[t]he limited recovery available in dissolution actions
is easily circumvented if spouses are allowed to sue each other because of
love-related promises [and because] a couple undergoing the unpleasantness of
a dissolution could wind up in civil court litigating the very emotional under-
pinnings of the marriage itself in a 'fraud' action. This is just another name for
'fault' divorce." Id. at 959-60, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294-95. Under the former
breach of promise lawsuit, the plaintiff could recover for emotional suffering,
damage to reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, and the expectation of
sharing in the defendant's wealth and social position. See id. at 960, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 294. In dissolution proceedings, the plaintiff could recover only
half the community property, appropriate support order, and attorney fees with"no hefty premiums for emotional angst." Id., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295.
337. For example, one court found that even though the public policy of
California family law is to eliminate fault as a ground for dissolution of mar-
riage and as a consideration in the division of property, the policy did not pro-
hibit husband and wife from pursuing appropriate civil remedies against one
another. See In re Marriage of McNeill, 160 Cal. App. 3d 548, 556, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 645 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage
of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 451 n.13, 715 P.2d 253, 260 n.13, 224 Cal. Rptr.
333, 340 n.13 (1986). In McNeill, the husband claimed that he had been in-
duced to transfer property in reliance on his wife's misrepresentations about
her health and profession. See McNeill, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 555, 206 Cal.
Rplr. at 643-44. After the wife filed a dissolution petition, the husband filed a
civil action for, among other causes of action, fraud and rescission. See id.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's consolidation of the civil and dis-
solution actions under California Rules of Court 1212 and Civil Procedure
Code section 1048, noting that the husband had to file a separate civil action to
be compensated for the fraud. See id. at 556-58, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 644-46. The
Askew court distinguished McNeill on the basis that both the nature and the
time of the misrepresentations were different; the statements in McNeill were
all made after the marriage and had nothing to do with love, sex, or passion.
See Askew, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 960-61, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295.
In Dale, the California Court of Appeal held that in the absence of a
pending dissolution proceeding, a wife can bring a subsequent tort action based
on her spouse's alleged tortious concealment of community assets from her
during a dissolution proceeding. See Dale v. Dale, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1172, 78
Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Ct App. 1998). The Court of Appeal refused to consider
the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the litiga-
tion privilege because the trial court had not yet ruled on the defendants' mo-
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no-fault states, spouses can recover nothing through dissolution pro-
ceedings for emotional losses or for pain and suffering.338 Confining
spouses to their dissolution remedies is reasonable only if the legis-
lature has excluded other compensation for all kinds of domestic
misconduct. When the only legislative determination concerns heart
balm claims and fault grounds for divorce, then the legislature did
not intend to abolish other torts arising out of the marital relation-
ship, and other kinds of domestic misconduct should remain an eligi-
ble ground for an RED clain Otherwise, some spouses will be al-
lowed to seriously harm their partners through conduct that would be
tortious if it were directed at anyone else.
339
B. Public Policy
1. Does the claim necessarily fail because it is based on statements
made during a dissolution proceeding?
The litigation privilege bars spousal TIED claims based on things
said during or in connection with dissolution proceedings. Although
individual results may seem unfair, immunity for false and malicious
statements or evidence is especially necessary in divorce proceedings
because of the parties' "emotional involvement" and the many
statements made in the heat of the moment. The litigation privilege
immunizes spouses for communications made during the dissolution
proceeding, but does not protect "noncommunicative conduct," nor
does it protect communications made before, after, or completely un-
connected with the litigation.
340
The privilege is designed to ensure free access to the courts,
promote complete and truthful testimony, encourage zealous advo-
cacy, give finality to judgments, and avoid unending litigation. It ac-
complishes these goals by protecting all statements-true, false, or
tion based on the litigation privilege. See id. at 1184 & n.10, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 520 & n.10.
338. SeeNagyv. Nagy, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1262, 1270-71, 258 Cal. Rptr. 787,
791-92 (1989).
339. This lack of consequence was the basis for Professor Schwartz's pro-
posal that legislatures create a cause of action for "abuse of the marital rela-
tionship" by a serious marital offender. See Schwartz, supra note 25, at 232.
340. See Sheila M. Smith, Comment Absolute Privilege and California Civil
Code Section 47(2): A Need for Consistency, 14 PAC. L.J. 105 (1982).
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hurtful-made during the course of litigation. Thus, the litigation
privilege protects spouses who tell the truth ("I don't love you any-
more"); make threats ("I'll make you pay"); and tell lies ("the house
is worth only $120,000") as long as what they say has a reasonable
relationship to the proceeding.
California's privilege applies broadly and blocks any cause
of action based on communications that are related to a dissolution
proceeding.34' Although the litigation privilege originally protected
341. Most states recognize an absolute privilege that provides immunity for
definatory communications preliminary to, or in the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding if the communication has "some relation" to the proceeding. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 (1977) (parties); id. § 588 (wit-
nesses); id. § 589 (attorneys); HARPER, supra note 14, § 5.22, at 181-92.
In California, the litigation privilege is found in Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b). The section provides:
A privileged publication or broadcast is one made-
2. In any... judicial proceeding... except... [a]n allegation
or averment contained in any pleading or affidavit filed in an action
for marital dissolution or legal separation made of or concerning a
person by or against whom no affirmative relief is prayed in the action
shall not be a privileged publication or broadcast as to the person
making the allegation or averment within the meaning of this section
unless the pleading is verified or affidavit sworn to, and is made with-
out malice, by one having reasonable and probable cause for believing
the truth of the allegation or averment and unless the allegation or
averment is material and relevant to the issues in the action.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(2) (West 1999).
The "divorce proviso" was added to the statute in 1927 and applies to al-
legations involving co-respondents; its inclusion implies that all other commu-
nications are privileged without regard to malice. See id.
On its face, the privilege applies to any publication or broadcast made in
a "judicial proceeding." The California Supreme Court recently reiterated that
the privilege applies to all torts except malicious prosecution and to any com-
munication "required or permitted by law in the course of a judicial proceeding
to achieve the object of the litigation, even though [it] is made outside the
courtroom and no function of the court or its officers is involved." Silberg v.
Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 786 P.2d 365, 369, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 641-42
(Cal. 1990). A history of the development of California's litigation privilege
can be found in Smith, supra note 340. In addition to the cases discussed in
this section, see generally Green v. Uccell, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1112, 1124, 255
Cal. Rptr. 315, 321 (Ct. App. 1989) (using statutory privilege to bar husband's
HED claim against wife's divorce attorney); Carden v. Getzoff, 190 Cal. App.
3d 907, 913-14, 235 Cal. Rptr. 698, 701 (Ct App. 1987) (confirming that ac-
countant's valuation report and testimony in divorce proceeding were privi-
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litigants, attorneys, and witnesses against liability only for defama-
tion, it has been interpreted to apply to all torts, except malicious
prosecution, and to any communication, whether or not it amounts to
a publication. Thus, for example, in Silberg v. Anderson,342 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that an attorney's alleged misrepresenta-
tions about an expert witness in a dissolution proceeding were cov-
ered by the privilege because an occasional unfair result, fraudulent
communication, or perjured testimony was the price to be paid for
free access to the courts without fear of harassing derivative tort ac-
tions.343 By immunizing participants from liability for torts arising
from communications made during judicial proceedings, "the law
places upon litigants the burden of exposing during trial the bias of
witnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby enhancing the finality
of judgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of litigation, an
evil far worse than an occasional unfair result."3 "
The privilege does not apply to torts based on grounds other
than communications made during a judicial proceeding. As a result,
the California Supreme Court has distinguished between the privi-
leged "injury allegedly arising from communicative acts" and the
leged against husband's claim of abuse of process and IIED); Chauncey v.
Niems, 182 Cal. App. 3d 967, 980-81, 227 Cal. Rptr. 718, 727-28 (Ct. App.
1986) (determining that statutory privilege applied to IIED claims brought by
ex-husband against former wife and her attorney).
342. 50 Cal. 3d205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1990).
343. See id. at 214-15, 786 P.2d at 370, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 643-44. The Silberg
lawsuit followed a divorce proceeding in which the defendant Margaret An-
derson, was the attorney for the wife of the plaintiff, Barry Silberg. See id. at
210, 786 P.2d at 367, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 640. The husband, plaintiff, claimed
damages incurred when Anderson's misrepresentations about an expert witness
caused him the loss of reasonable visitation arrangements with his children,
damage to his reputation in the community and emotional distress. See id.
The defendant claimed that her statements about the impartiality of the expert
were made during the litigation and were, therefore, privileged. See id. at 211,
786 P.2d at 368, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 641. The trial court agreed; the intermediate
court of appeal held that the plaintiff husband should be allowed to amend his
"intentional tort" cause of action to allege an "improper objective" by the de-
fendant Anderson, which would preclude application of the litigation privilege
and allow Silberg to proceed on that cause of action. See id. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the privilege was absolute. See id. at 212-13, 786
P.2d at 368-69, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42.
344. Id. at 214, 786 P.2d at 370, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
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actionable "injury resulting from noncommunicative conduct., 34 5 In
Kimmel v. Goland,346 for example, the court decided that the privi-
lege did not shield a defendant from liability for the unlawful re-
cording of confidential telephone conversations made in anticipation
of litigation because the defendants alleged that they were injured
"from the taping of confidential telephone conversations, not from
any 'publication' ... of the information contained in these conversa-
tions. 347 Earlier, in Ribas v. Clark,345 the court had determined that
the litigation privilege barred a similar action based on IED and the
common law right to privacy "because [the] alleged injury stems
solely from defendant's testimony at the arbitration proceeding."
3 49
Drawing a distinction between "eavesdropping, in violation of the
privacy act, and testifying during an arbitration hearing," the court
allowed the civil award specified by statute for the act of eavesdrop-
ping "[b]ecause the right to such an award accrues at the moment of
the violation [and thus] is not barred by the judicial privilege.
',35
345. Kimmel v. Goland, 51 Cal. 3d 202, 211, 793 P.2d 524, 529, 271 Cal.
Rptr. 191, 196 (1990). The California Supreme Court claimed in Kimmel that
this threshold determination had been established in a case in which a hospital
claimed immunity under the litigation privilege from liability for termination
of a physician's staff privileges. The doctor's claim:
[Was] not that her injury ha[d] been occasioned simply by [the hospi-
tal's] malicious statements at the proceedings, but rather that she ha[d]
been injured by the malicious actions of the hospital.., in revoking
her staff privileges.... Although... [section 47(2)] has on occasion
been applied in contexts other than a defamation action [citation
omitted], its absolute privilege has always attached only to statements
or publications made in connection with the applicable proceeding.
Id. (quoting Westlake Community Hosp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 465,
482, 551 P.2d 410, 131 Cal. Rptr. 90, 100 (1976)(emphasis in original)).
346. 51 Cal. 3d 202, 793 P.2d 524, 271 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1990).
347. Id. at 209, 793 P.2d at 528, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 195. The holding was
"limited to the injury resulting from plaintiffi' and [their attorney's] conduct.
To the extent the complaint rests on [the attorney's] alleged communicative
acts of 'counseling' and 'advising' his clients, the privilege is clearly opera-
tive." Id. at 208 n.6, 793 P.2d at 527 n.6, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 207 n.6. The tape
recording violated CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (West 1999), a violation for which
civil damages are specifically provided by CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (West
1999).
348. 38 Cal. 3d 355, 696 P.2d 637, 212 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1985).
349. Id. at 364, 696 P.2d at 643, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
350. Id. at 365, 696 P.2d at 643-44, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 149. In Ribas, the
plaintiffs wife asked her attorney to listen on an extension telephone while she
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Finally, in Rubin v. Green,35' the court held that even allegedly
wrongful attorney solicitation fell within the litigation privilege be-
cause the acts "were communicative in their essential nature" and
had "some relation" to an anticipated lawsuit.352 Referring to Ribas
and Kimmel, the court reiterated that the distinction was between in-
jury based on noncommunicative conduct (taping and eavesdrop-
ping) and communicative conduct (using the information in pro-
ceedings).353
To overcome the privilege, plaintiffs seeking redress for inter-
ference with a parent-child relationship must show that their injury
resulted not from any statement made in the course of the dissolution
proceeding, but instead from conduct or statements made before or
outside that proceeding.354 The concurring judge in Nagy endorsed
such an argument, criticizing the majority opinion for failing to dis-
tinguish between conduct that occurred during a proceeding and
conduct that occurred outside the proceeding, but was revealed
spoke to her husband. See id. at 358, 696 P.2d at 639, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
On the basis of information obtained during the telephone conversation, the
wife filed an action to set aside the dissolution decree, alleging that her hus-
band had procured the settlement agreement by fraud. See id. The attorney
testified about the contents of the call during an arbitration hearing. See id.
Following the hearing, the husband sued the attorney for violation of Penal
Code sections 631, subdivision (a) and 637.2, as well as common law invasion
of privacy, IIED and outrage. See id. The trial court determined that the attor-
ney was immune from liability on all causes of action because of the litigation
privilege. See id.
351. 4 Cal. 4th 1187, 847 P.2d 1044, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828 (1993).
352. See id. at 1194-96, 847 P.2d at 1048-49, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33. The
plaintiff's claims were founded on alleged misrepresentations made by the law
firm in the course of discussions about "the possibility of being retained to
prosecute" a lawsuit "and the subsequent filing of pleadings in the lawsuit it-
self." Id. at 1196, 847 P.2d at 1049, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
353. See id. at 1195, 847 P.2d 1048, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
354. California courts have foreclosed the use of related torts to avoid the
litigation privilege in dissolution matters. That is, even though a malicious
prosecution action can survive the sections 47(2) privilege, such actions are not
allowed in family matters. See Bidna v. Rosen, 19 Cal. App. 4th 27, 31, 23
Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1993) (remedy for egregious conduct is sanc-
tions by the family court); Begier v. Strom, 46 Cal. App. 4th 877, 877-88, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d 158, 165 (Ct App. 1996) (malicious prosecution should not be
extended into family law). Abuse of process claims cannot survive the section
47(2) privilege. See Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hosp., 217 Cal. App.
3d 796, 824, 266 Cal. Rptr. 360, 377-78 (Ct App. 1990).
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during the proceeding. 5  Simply revealing the underlying conduct
during the proceeding did not make it privileged, the concurrence
said; it was not the wife's statement during the deposition that was
the basis for the husband's IED claim, but her knowingly false rep-
resentations for three and one-half years during the marriage. 6 As
demonstrated by the results in Kimmel, Ribas, and Begier, plaintiffs
also can overcome the privilege by showing that another statute pro-
vides a civil remedy for the conduct.
2. Can the claim survive traditional policy arguments?
Because of its emotional power, the Nagy argument that creation
of a close and loving relationship with a child is simply not "dam-
age" exerts powerful influence.357 The argument grows out of a per-
sonal reaction that claiming such damages is another way of saying,
"I wish you had never been born," and the historical reluctance to
recognize the "'incalculable' values of social relationships" because
of the difficulty of calculating damages.358 As for the argument that
people simply should not be claiming damages for such events, a
plaintiff can differentiate his claim from Nagy's on the basis that it
seeks damages not for the creation of but for the threatened destruc-
tion of a parent-child relationship. As for the argument that money
355. SeeNagyv. Nagy, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1262, 1271-72, 258 Cal. Rptr. 787,
792 (Ct App. 1989) (Johnson, J., concurring).
356. This justice would still have barred the claim on public policy grounds.
See id. at 1276, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
357. The concurring judge in Nagy disagreed that the basis for the husband's
damage claim was the creation of a close relationship with the child. Instead,
the husband sought damages for the emotional distress he suffered because of
the attempt to end that relationship, making the claim no different from any
other fraud claim where the plaintiff seeks reimbursement for investments that
he was fraudulently induced to make. See Nagy, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1272,
258 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (Johnson, J., concurring). Justice Johnson also said that
emotional distress is a damage caused by the fraud and compensable, dis-
agreeing specifically with the majority that emotional distress damages are al-
lowed only as aggravation of other damages in fraud cases. See id. at 1273 n.1,
258 Cal. Rptr. at 793 n.1 (Johnson, J., concurring). But he still would have
barred the fraud claim on public policy grounds because it occurred during the
marriage. See id. at 1276, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 795 (Johnson, J., concurring).
358. Levit supra note 24, at 149 & n.75; see also Michael B. Kelly, The
Righful Position in "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1991)
(discussing courts' resistance to the wrongful life claim because of the nature
of the damages).
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damages cannot possibly compensate for such a loss, money dam-
ages also cannot compensate for the loss of an arm or a leg but no
one questions their appropriateness in such personal injury cases.
Monetary "compensation is a necessary-although not sufficient-
remedy on a variety of levels."359 Monetary compensation provides
medical and psychological care, legitimizes the interests and emo-
tions that were injured, and reaffirms societal expectations that
wrongdoers will not profit from their wrongs.36 °
A related argument is that emotional distress damages cannot be
calculated because they are uncertain and speculative. In fact, emo-
tional injuries are "far from uncertain in a scientific sense. Although
often the product of multiple causes, [such] injuries display patterns
of repetitive, predictable order. ' 361 Difficult problems of establish-
ing the amount of damages and deciding the cause of injuries are en-
countered elsewhere in the tort system and are not seen as impedi-
ments when physical injury is involved. Although some courts and
commentators are concerned about the filing of false claims for
emotional distress, there is little evidence that plaintiffs regularly
malinger to file tort actions, and courts and juries have been able to
discern false claims for physical injury and to put dollar amounts on
physical pain and suffering.362 Requiring the plaintiff to file a sepa-
rate tort claim in a different forum will divorce the claim from an
overall examination of the marital relationship. Separating the ac-
tions may allow the court to impose a more stringent requirement of
proof that the plaintiff s emotional distress was caused, for example,
by misrepresentations of paternity rather than by the process of going
through a divorce.
Constitutional privacy objections can be raised to some HIED
claims based on intimate conduct, but claims based on misrepresen-
tation of paternity pose little danger of intrusion into matters pro-
tected by a constitutional right of privacy. First, there will be no
claim unless the lying spouse has raised the issue of paternity.
363
359. Levit, supra note 24, at 188.
360. See id.
361. Id. at 191.
362. See id. at 187-88.
363. Any remaining concerns about preserving marital harmony do not ap-
ply: the spouse who makes the cause of action possible by revealing the mis-
representation of paternity could have maintained marital harmony but chose
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Second, the issue of paternity can be resolved by a blood test, with-
out an inquiry into anyone's sex life. Even if such a claim required
an inquiry into private matters, a plaintiff could overcome the con-
stitutional objection based on the state's interest in preservation of
the parent-child relationship.364 Although usually raised as an argu-
ment that particular outrageous conduct is privileged and rarely
raised to block spousal HED altogether, some spousal statements
may be protected by the First Amendment.365 Thus, the spouse's
truthful revelation that the husband is not the biological father proba-
bly cannot be the basis for a successful claim. However, there is no
First Amendment right to lie about paternity. Therefore, the exercise
of free speech cannot protect the underlying misrepresentations that
created a tenuous relationship.
The remaining policy arguments fall generally into the category
of protecting judicial efficiency. In contrast to physical injuries,
courts are always more concerned about fraudulent and frivolous
emotional distress claims because of an underlying belief that per-
haps no claim for emotional or mental distress is quite genuine.366
For spousal RED claims, courts reflect particular concern that garden
variety, run of the mill family law matters may "metastasize into
not to.
364. Perhaps because of concern about transmission of the disease, courts
have found liability in some cases of sexual deceit resulting in physical injury
despite the intimate nature of the inquiry required and potential problems of
proof. See Murray & Winslett, supra note 24, at 823-24.
In the first appellate case to recognize a right to sue for the transmission
of herpes, the court said the tortious nature of the conduct plus the state's inter-
est in prevention and control of diseases brought the injury "within the type of
physical injury [that justifies judicial inquiry into sexual relations]. The con-
stitutional right of privacy does not protect respondent here." Kathleen K. v.
Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (Ct. App. 1984).
365. See Richard D. Bernstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Li-
ability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 1749, 1755 (1985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmit. d
(1965) ("[t]here must still be freedom to express an unflattering opinion"); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at
59 (5th ed. 1984). Spouses may even have a protected liberty or privacy inter-
est when they intentionally cause emotional distress by engaging in an extra-
marital relationship. See Hakkila v. Hakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1324 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1991); Givelber, supra note 41, at 57.
366. This concern "often creates almost a presumption that claims of mental
disturbance are frivolous." Levit, supra note 24, at 172.
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something else ' 367 and that such claims will be used to undermine or
distort the established family law process. 368 "Claims for emotional
loss are far easier to plead than claims for physical injury," and a
great many more spouses may "see their estranged mates as perpe-
trators of outrageous, emotionally abusive conduct than [those who]
see them as perpetrators of physical battery. ' 3 69 Because of their
emotional state and because they are engaged in battles over prop-
erty, children, and finances, there will be a temptation and
an incentive to carry over the (all too often) characteristic
bitterness of family litigation into [other litigation], where
one spouse can try to smack the other with the really big
club of tort damages rather than curing a failure to live up
to Family Code obligations of disclosure within the more
predictable confines of a dissolution proceeding. 70
If courts allow spousal IIED claims based on interference with the
parent-child relationship, parents and their lawyers may be tempted
to try to gain an advantage in custody or support arrangements by
threatening or filing an RED cause of action.37'
367. d'Elia v. d'Elia, 58 Cal. App. 4th 415, 417, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 325
(Ct. App. 1997). In d'Elia, the wife failed to conduct an independent appraisal
of a family business and consequently claimed that the value had been misrep-
resented and that she had therefore been induced to settle for too little in the
marital settlement agreement. See id. at 417-18, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326.
Rather than seeking to set aside the agreement, the wife filed a lawsuit seeking
damages under state securities fraud laws. The court refused to allowed her ac-
tion to proceed. See id. at 326, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 418-19.
368. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1294.
369. Ellman, supra note 19, at 802; Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at
1294. Professor Givelber claims that an ilED suit is much cheaper than a neg-
ligence claim because there is no need for experts on causation of extent of
injury and much easier because it does not depend on the willingness of ex-
perts "to verify the existence and extent of suffering by the plaintiff and to as-
sert that it is more probable than not that the defendant's conduct caused plain-
tiff's injury." Givelber, supra note 41, at 51.
370. d'Elia, 58 Cal. App. 4th at 418, 68 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326.
371. Both the danger that claims might be filed to harass and the solution to
that danger are illustrated in an Oregon case where a father sued his former
wife and her new husband for HED based on conduct he claimed was designed
to estrange him from his children. See Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 901 P.2d 986 (Or.
Ct. App. 1995). The conduct included intentionally disparaging the father's
character and reputation by encouraging the children to call him by his first
name; encouraging the children to cut short their visits with their father; plan-
524
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The best safeguards against such fears are the traditional ones:
sanctions should be imposed on clients and attorneys who file such
claims; courts should examine complaints and grant motions to dis-
miss and summary judgment motions when a plaintiff cannot state
the elements of the tort; and the requirements of intent, causation,
and serious emotional distress should be taken as seriously as the
element of extreme and outrageous conduct. A requirement that the
tort action must be filed separately from the divorce proceeding may
discourage frivolous claims designed only to harass or force unfa-
vorable settlements.372
ning activities for the children in conflict with the father's scheduled visits;
causing the children to be known by the new husband's surname; and encour-
aging the children to identify with their mother's new husband as their father.
The court found that the conduct was "all too common in the context of a hos-
tile dissolution involving childrein" and that it is not "'outrageous in the ex-
treme' to behave as people commonly behave in certain circumstances." Id. at
988-89. The dissent pointed out that the "alleged frequency of harassment and
taunts based on gender, race or sexual orientationf' has not been used to defeat
claims that those actions were "outrageous in the extreme." Id. at 989 (Leeson,
J., dissenting).
372. Allowing a tort action between divorcing parties raises procedural is-
sues that are beyond the scope of this article. But none of these problems have
precluded spousal claims based on battery and they should not preclude the
kinds of actions endorsed here.
After the abolition of interspousal immunity, a growing number of cases
and commentators addressed the issue of whether a tort action between spouses
can be, must be, or should not be joined with an action for dissolution of the
marriage. See generally Steven J. Gaynor, Annotation, Joinder of Tort Actions
Between Spouses with Proceeding for Dissolution of Marriage, 4 A.L.R. 5TH
972 (1992). For commentary on this issue, see, for example, Barbara H.
Young, Interspousal Torts and Divorce: Problems, Policies, Procedures, 27 J.
FAM. L. 489 (1989) (advising domestic relations attorneys on the procedural
problems posed by filing tort claims in connection with dissolution proceed-
ings); Andrew Schepard, Divorce, Interspousal Torts, and Res Judicata, 24
FAM. L.Q. 127 (1990) (examining whether claim preclusion should bar an in-
terspousal tort action filed after a final divorce judgment); Valencia Bilyeu,
Joining Interspousal Personal Injury Tort Claims with Divorce Actions, 30
IDAHO L. REv. 859 (1994) (favoring permissive joinder of interspousal tort
claims and divorce actions); Patricia A. Harris, Note, Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress and Divorce: An Argument Against Joinder, 34 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 897 (1996) (recommending independent litigation of
BED following dissolution).
Some jurisdictions prohibit joinder, others allow it, but usually do not re-
quire it See, e.g., Nelson v. Jones, 787 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1990) (holding
joinder permissible but not required); Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602
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1. Would recognizing the claim further the goals of state tort law?
There is no question that emotional distress can be caused by the
disruption and threatened loss of relationships, perhaps especially the
parent-child relationship. The distress may arise from a variety of
emotions--grief, anxiety, depression, shock, fear, embarrassment-
and these emotional states may "psychologically, financially, and
physically cripple people. '' 373 Since this real loss is not fully com-
pensated elsewhere, recognizing spousal HED claims based on inter-
ference with the parent-child relationship furthers most of the com-
monly recognized goals of tort law. The claim provides more
complete compensation for married people who are wrongfully
(Colo. App. 1988) (prohibitingjoinder); Henriksen v. Cameron, 622 A.2d 1135
(Me. 1993) (statingjoinder not required); Koepke v. Koepke, 556 N.E.2d 1198
(Ohio App. 1989) (prohibiting joinder); Walther v. Walther, 709 P.2d 387
(Utah 1985) (prohibiting joinder); Stuart v. Stuart, 410 N.W. 2d 632, 638 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 421 N.W.2d 505 (Wis. 1988) (stating joinder not re-
quired); Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 624-25 (Tex. 1993) (joinder
preferred but not required).
In no-fault states, joinder may be undesirable: "[A]nyone who favors no-
fault divorce, believing that the legal process should not focus on recrimina-
tions and assigning blame, should oppose joining a spousal suit for outrageous
marital conduct with the divorce action." Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16,
at 1285-86. If allowed, the dissolution action should be tried separately and
first. See, e.g., Hakkila v. Hlakkila, 812 P.2d 1320, 1330-31 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991) (Donnelly, J., specially concurring) (suggesting the separate trial alter-
native to avoid injection of "issues of fault into no-fault divorce proceedings
and [to allow] the trial court to mediate custody and property disputes or to
achieve an equitable resolution of the issues between the parties").
No-fault and community property states often have statutory provisions
that explicitly or implicitly prohibit joinder of tort claims. In California, for
example, a tort action claiming damages cannot be joined with or pleaded in a
dissolution proceeding. See CAL. R. CT. 1212. In addition, joinder is disal-
lowed because the family court's jurisdiction over the parties' separate prop-
erty is limited. See In re Marriage of Braud, 45 Cal. App. 4th 797, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 179 (Ct. App. 1996). But a tort claim can be consolidated with a
pending dissolution action under suitable circumstances. See In re Marriage of
McNeill, 160 Cal. App. 3d 548, 206 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644-45 (Ct. App. 1984),
overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715
P.2d 253, 260, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Cal. 1986); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1048(a) (West 1980).
373. Levit, supra note 24, at 184-85.
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harmed by their spouses, 7 punishes injurious and socially unaccept-
able behavior,375 holds the individuals responsible for their harmful
conduct, reaffirms societal values, 376 and protects the dignity inter-
ests of the victims.
377
Recognizing these claims might not, however, achieve the tort
law goal of deterring future injurious or socially unacceptable be-
havior3 78 because a spouse determined to inflict emotional distress
will not be deterred from doing so by the threat of a damage award.
It may be especially unlikely that a spouse intent on preserving a
marriage will be deterred from lying about the paternity of a child
born during the marriage, or that a spouse intent on ending a mar-
riage and winning custody will be deterred from finally telling the
truth about the paternity of the child.379
374. Commentators agree that spousal tort suits will increase compensation
by allowing pain and suffering and possible punitive damages. See Tobias, su-
pra note 26, at 470; Ellman, supra note 19, at 789-90; Ellman & Sugarman,
supra note 16, at 1286-87. However, Professors Ellman and Sugarman suggest
that allowing spousal emotional distress claims will not really further the goal
of compensation because medical expenses and lost wages would be consid-
ered in divorce proceedings. See id. at 1287-90.
375. Under current divorce laws, punishment is thought to be an inappropri-
ate goal in family matters and punitive damages are not available in dissolution
actions. Professor Givelber concluded that awarding compensatory damages
for lIED furthers goals usually associated with punitive damages: (1) punish-
ment of the defendant as a deterrent to future wrongs and as ethical retribution;
(2) deterrence of others; (3) law enforcement by encouraging plaintiff to sue to
right societal wrongs; (4) provision of complete compensation through addi-
tional funds to pay the attorney; and (5) reaffirmation of societal values. See
Givelbar, supra note 56, at 54 n.63. "If punitive damages are also awarded,
punishment and control are intensified." Id.
376. See Levit, supra note 24, at 190 (stating that whether the legal system
recognizes particular wrongs says a good deal about what the legal system val-
ues). In addition, recognition of such torts promotes "responsible social inter-
action [by making] a commitment to the value of the permanency of relation-
ships and to appropriate treatment within those relationships." Id. at 150.
377. Recognizing spousal lIED causes of action is sometimes viewed as vin-
dicating the individual rights of women. See Tobias, supra note 26, at 471-72
(noting that a few courts cited the vindication of women's individual rights as
an affirmative policy reason for eliminating interspousal immunity).
378. See Ellman & Sugarman, supra note 16, at 1287-90 (noting that the
standard is so imprecise that it cannot deter others).
379. Other kinds of domestic deceit may be more likely candidates for deter-
rence; for example, permitting tort litigation when financial fraud is present
may eventually limit fraudulent conduct Therefore, "[a]llowing a spouse who
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2. Does the claim satisfy the requirements of state tort law?
Given the abrogation of spousal immunity, the recognition of
IIED, and the absence of compelling reasons of public policy to re-
ject liability, the only remaining question is whether the claim can
meet the elements of the tort. Recognizing spousal RED causes of
action for intentional and unjustified interference with the parent-
child relationship poses no danger of unlimited liability if the courts
require proof of all the elements of the tort.
For example, Steve H. would first have to show that Wendy
acted intentionally or recklessly in causing his emotional distress.
Once the dissolution proceedings started, it might be assumed that
Wendy desired to cause Steve to suffer emotional distress. But for
the reasons discussed in Part V.B.1, her statements made in the
course of the proceedings cannot be used to prove intent (or any
other element of the tort). Thus, Steve would have to show that
Wendy acted intentionally or recklessly to fraudulently create a
tenuous parent-child relationship between Steve and Stephanie. If
Wendy's statements and conduct led him to believe that he was
Stephanie's father, Steve probably could establish that Wendy acted
with reckless disregard of a high probability that he would suffer
emotional distress. Reckless disregard is shown because at the time
of the misrepresentations, Wendy not only knew that another man
was Stephanie's biological father, but she also continued her affair
with him, making it more probable that Steve would eventually learn
the truth.
Second, Steve must show that Wendy's actions created a tenu-
ous relationship between him and Stephanie and that it was the cause
of his emotional distress, not the revelation of Wendy's adultery and
Stephanie's paternity. Although sorting out causation is unques-
tionably difficult in such circumstances, plaintiffs in other emotional
distress cases have been in similar situations when the wrongful act
occurred.380 Further, other torts have causation problems as well,
381
intentionally concealed the existence of community assets during the course of
a dissolution proceeding to avoid liability for punitive damages likely would
encourage such tortious behavior... [T]raditional tort remedies, including
the risk of an award of punitive damages, should have a greater deterrent effect
than the remedies available in family court." Dale v. Dale, 66 Cal. App. 4th
1172, 1187,78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 522 (Ct App. 1998).
380. See Givelber, supra note 41, at 49.
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and the impossibility of proving the defendant's role in the creation
of the injury has been found to be an appropriate reason to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant.
3 8 2
Third, Steve would have to show that the emotional distress
caused by Wendy's conduct was severe. Again, the proof of this
element should be no different from the showing required for any
other emotional distress cause of action.
Finally, Steve would have to show that Wendy's conduct was
extreme and outrageous. Despite criticism, the combination of "ex-
treme" and "outrageous" in the Restatement formula allows courts to
formulate a workable balancing test along the lines suggested by Pro-
fessor Cole: "extreme and outrageous conduct" is at the high end of
a scale of conduct, it is conduct that is socially unacceptable, and it is
conduct that is done for no good reason.383 That is, the defendant
cannot justify the conduct by any privilege such as the exercise of a
constitutional right, or any defense such as consent or self-defense.
In a marriage, battery obviously meets the test. If the scale of objec-
tionable marital conduct begins with verbal criticism, battery is at the
high end. Its recognition as both a crime and a tort shows a social
consensus that battery is unacceptable. Finally, it is no longer
imaginable to justify regular physical abuse, but a battery that occurs
in self-defense may not be extreme and outrageous because it is justi-
fied. Other domestic conduct is more difficult to assess. Again, if
the scale begins with verbal criticism, vicious insults and threats are
higher up the scale, but there is no easy answer to whether such con-
duct is socially unacceptable and some justifications may be offered.
In Steve H.'s case, Wendy's conduct is more similar to the bat-
tery example. Fraudulently creating a parental relationship that im-
poses legal obligations and allows parent and child to form emotional
bonds with the knowledge that the relationship could be disrupted
at any moment is extreme conduct, highly likely to inflict emo-
tional harm. Since most states have statutes establishing parental
381. See Levit, supra note 24, at 167-69 (pointing out that courts admit other
kinds of "highly probabilistic" evidence with respect to causation and dam-
ages).
382. See Levit, supra note 24, at 190; ef Givelber, supra note 41, at 49
(stating that cases involving physical injury typically require an expert to prove
both causation and extent of damages).
383. See Cole, supra note 50, at 577.
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relationships and recognizing rights and obligations flowing from
such relationships, conduct that interferes with rights and obligations
imposed by state law may be viewed as socially unacceptable.384
Finally, a court should examine whether there is any justifica-
tion for such an interference. If, for example, a spouse has abused a
child, there is obviously justification for attempting to sever an es-
tablished parental relationship. Even in the case of Steve H., Wendy
might argue that her actions were justified because of the need to
preserve her marriage or to protect her child. However, a court
should balance these factors to determine whether her conduct was
extreme and outrageous, rather than reject the claim on public policy
grounds.
In addition to meeting the requirements of lIED, spousal claims
based on intentional interference with the parent-child relationship
are analogous to the claims recognized by most courts because they
resolve problems related to recovery for emotional distress. As the
conflicting results in prior cases indicate, the difference between the
claims that are allowed to proceed and those that are rejected is the
kind of harm resulting from the wrongful conduct. In the battery and
sexual deceit cases, the physical harm is recognizable because it re-
sults in bodily injury and bodily injury is always compensable. In
the interference with custody cases, the harm is recognizable because
it consists of interference with an established right of the plaintiff,
usually one that has been established by a prior court order. In the
more recent cases involving emotional distress resulting from inter-
ference with parent-child relationships, plaintiffs have overcome the
Nagy objection that no recognizable harm results from the creation of
a close and loving relationship with a child. They claim that the rec-
ognizable harm is personal injury in the form of emotional losses
suffered as a result of the threatened destruction of the parent-child
relationship. Like the interference with custody cases, the harm also
is recognizable because it consists of interference with the plaintiff's
established right to custody, acquired in many states because of the
384. See, e.g., Plante v. Engel, 469 A.2d 1299, 1301-02 (N.H. 1983) (adopt-
ing the tort of custodial interference because of the significance that state law
affords the parent-child relationship and determining that parents should be
fully compensated for any intentional interference with their custodial relation-
ships).
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presumption of paternity for a child born during a marriage. Fur-
thermore, most people would agree that misrepresenting paternity to
a spouse who would otherwise form neither financial nor emotional
bonds with a child is so out of bounds as to be outrageous in any
marriage without requiring an inquiry into its private norms.
Finally, a spousal HlED claim based on parental interference is
necessary because there are no viable substitutes. Powerful, tradi-
tional arguments render fraud an inadequate alternative even though
the cause of action is based on misrepresentation. Precedents include
the abolition of heart balm actions, indicating to some courts that no
lies that lead to creation or destruction of family relationships should
be recognized as legally compensable. They also include the Nagy
argument that creation of a close and loving relationship with a child
is simply not "damage." A fraud claim seeks recovery of damages
incurred in reliance on the misrepresentation. Therefore, it encoun-
ters the argument that allowing the claim contradicts provisions of
state family codes that require parents to support their children even
if they later learn that they are not biological parents.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article endorses recognition of spousal emotional distress
causes of action based on intentional interference with relationships
between parents and children. Like marriage, parenthood creates a
relationship with emotional consequences and legal dimensions.
Unlike marriage, parenthood cannot be dissolved by saying "I don't
love you anymore," and the legal consequences are guaranteed to last
for at least eighteen years. To recognize protectable interests in the
establishment and continuation of the parent-child relationship is to
recognize that these relationships are different from marriage, at least
in its current legal image as a voluntary joinder that can be dissolved
like any other partnership. Allowing liability for intentional and un-
justified disruption of the parent-child relationship may assure par-
ents and children that their expectations of continuity will be pro-
tected in this relationship.
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